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SHADES OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 
DOROTHY A. BROWN
 
ABSTRACT 
Federal tax policies such as the mortgage interest deduction do not 
generally encourage anyone to become a homeowner, yet they do increase 
the cost of housing. Low-income homeowners regardless of race are least 
likely to be able to take advantage of the mortgage interest deduction. 
They pay for a benefit that they cannot receive. Middle- and upper-income 
black homeowners are less likely than middle- and upper-income white 
homeowners to benefit from federal tax laws supporting homeownership in 
different ways. The appreciation of most middle- and upper-income black 
homes is significantly less than the appreciation of middle- and upper-
income white homes. As a result, those black homeowners will not benefit 
as much as white homeowners from the tax provisions that exclude from 
income gain on the sale of their homes. This Article suggests three 
solutions which, if enacted, would cause the tax benefits to be more 
equitably distributed and no longer concentrated in the hands of higher 
income, white taxpayers.  
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I will give you an example of how race affects my life. I live in a 
place called Alpine, New Jersey. . . . My house costs millions of 
dollars. . . . In my neighborhood, there are four black people. 
Hundreds of houses, four black people. Who are these black 
people? Well, there‘s me, Mary J. Blige, Jay-Z and Eddie Murphy. 
Only black people in the whole neighborhood. . . . Do you know 
what the white man that lives next door to me does for a living? 
He‘s a . . . dentist! 
—Chris Rock, Kill the Messenger (HBO Home Video 2009) 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
If Chris Rock is right, and there are only four blacks in his 
neighborhood, then Chris Rock‘s home is an excellent financial 
investment.
1
 Home ownership in Alpine, New Jersey, is an excellent 
financial investment precisely because very few blacks live there. Chris 
Rock and all other blacks in America are subject to the reality that once a 
neighborhood has more than 10% black homeowners, the home values 
decline.
2
 While recent events show the downside of homeownership for 
many Americans,
3
 for African-Americans generally, homeownership has 
always been a mixed blessing. 
Unlike Chris Rock, most African-Americans do not live in 
overwhelmingly white, wealthy neighborhoods.
4
 For the majority of 
 
 
 1. Cf. Glenn Beck, Media Attacks Sarah Palin; Can Palin Win Over Clintonites?; What is 
Troopergate? (CNN television broadcast Sept. 3, 2008) (―Alpine, New Jersey, which only has a 
population of 1.5% that is black.‖).  
 2. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 
1984 (2000) (noting that one study ―finds that prices of residential units drop by 16% when the 
percentage of blacks in a neighborhood changes from less than 10% to 10–60%.‖); Nancy A. Denton, 
The Role of Residential Segregation in Promoting and Maintaining Inequality in Wealth and Property, 
34 IND. L. REV. 1199, 1207–08 (2001). Professor Denton writes: 
Though the work is not yet complete, our initial findings reveal that both blacks and whites 
are penalized for living in neighborhoods that are more heavily black. . . . units lose 
approximately sixteen percent of their value when neighborhood composition increases from 
less than ten percent black to between ten percent and sixty percent black, and they lose forty-
six percent of their value if the neighborhood‘s black population rises above sixty percent. 
These results vary significantly by region, following the same pattern as the declines in 
segregation discussed above. Western housing loses no more than 33% of its value when 
located in neighborhoods that are more than 10% black. By contrast, reductions in annual 
costs are as much as 40% in the South, 52% in the Midwest and 70% in the Northeast for 
dwellings located in neighborhoods that are more than 10% black.  
Id. (citations omitted); Thomas M. Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL‘Y 53, 68 (2006) (―Moreover, homes lose about 16% of their value when located in neighborhoods 
that are more than 10% black.‖) (citation omitted). 
 3. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, In the Current Foreclosure Crisis, Echoes of the Past, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2007, at 12 (―At the end of March, nearly 20 percent of loans to subprime borrowers—those 
with weak credit history—were past due or in foreclosure.‖); Clifford Krauss, Belatedly, Some States 
Move to Limit Damage From Subprime Lending, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2007, at C1 (―The Mortgage 
Bankers Association reports that 550,000 homeowners with subprime loans began a foreclosure 
process over the last year, and specialists say that the number could double in the next couple of 
years.‖); Alexandra Marks & Ron Scherer, As Foreclosures Mount, States Step In, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Apr. 5, 2007 (―The stakes are high: As many as 130,000 homeowners—the most in 30 
years—are going into foreclosure each month. Experts worry that entire neighborhoods will decline—
similar to what happened in the 1960s and ‗70s—as abandoned foreclosed homes cause property 
values to drop.‖). Cf. Frank S. Alexander, The Housing of America‘s Families: Control, Exclusion and 
Privilege, 54 EMORY L.J. 1231, 1232 (2005) (―Though homeownership rates may now be at sixty-
eight percent, we also are witnessing the highest recorded rates of residential foreclosures, and the 
average family has less equity in their [sic] home than ever before.‖). 
 4. See, e.g., David Rusk, The ―Segregation Tax‖: The Cost of Racial Segregation to Black 
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blacks, homeownership is a poor financial investment.
5
 To be sure, there 
are other non-financial benefits received by black homeowners, including 
better neighborhoods, better schools, and less crime.
6
 But the vast majority 
of whites receive better neighborhoods, better schools, less crime and a 
good financial investment when they become homeowners.
7
 
Homeownership in America has historically been viewed as a solid 
investment both financially
8
 and as a means of living the American 
Dream.
9
 This Article will show that homeownership has never been a good 
financial investment for either the vast majority of African-American 
homeowners or for low-income homeowners. Government subsidies for 
homeownership, especially federal tax subsidies, create winners and losers 
generally along race and class lines. 
 
 
Homeowners, BROOKINGS INST. SURVEY SERIES, Oct. 2001 at 4 (―[T]he typical black resident lived in 
a neighborhood that was 50 percent black, and almost two-thirds of black residents would have to 
move in order for every neighborhood to be 13 percent black.‖).  
 5. See infra Part IV.D. 
 6. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Rusk, supra note 4, at 2 (―Home equity is the typical American family‘s most important 
financial asset, and an important vehicle for transmitting wealth from generation to generation.‖). The 
flip side of this point, however, is that renters have significantly less wealth than homeowners. See, 
e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 670 n.300 (2006) 
(―According to a 2004 study of census data by the Pew Hispanic Center, the median net worth of 
renters is only 1% of the median net worth of homeowners.‖) (citations omitted); Molly S. McUsic, 
Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 591, 627 
n.167 (1998) (―[T]he median net worth of owner-occupiers is $77,183 compared to $2203 median net 
worth for renters.‖); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 65 (―Homeownership is the largest component of the 
wealth portfolios of both white and black families. In 2002, housing wealth accounted for 63% of all 
wealth in African-American families.‖) (citations omitted); Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race: 
When Making it to the Middle is Not Enough, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1777, 1790 (2004) (―[M]ost 
renters have far lower total net worth than their home-owning counterparts. The differences are not 
confined only to homes. Renters have fewer assets of every kind—stocks, bonds, retirement accounts, 
cars, personal property, small businesses, and so on.‖) (citation omitted); Lee Anne Fennell, Homes 
Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 627 (2002) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, 
AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001)) (―In 1998, the median family income of renters was less than half 
that of homeowners, and the median family net worth of renters was less than one-thirtieth that of 
homeowners.‖) (citation omitted). 
 9. See Douglas G. Baird, Technology, Information, and Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 
307 (―Living in one‘s own home is often touted as an integral part of the American Dream, and 
promoting homeownership is often an explicit government policy.‖) (citation omitted); Allison D. 
Christians, Breaking the Subsidy Cycle: A Proposal for Affordable Housing, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 131, 145 (1999) (―Homeownership has long been identified with the ‗American dream.‘ It is 
considered to be ‗a basic value in American society‘ and a ‗national good.‘‖) (citations omitted); 
Michael S. Knoll, Taxation, Negative Amortization and Affordable Mortgages, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341, 
1378 (1992) (―Homeownership is a cherished part of the American dream.‖).  
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Middle- and upper-income taxpayers who are overwhelmingly white 
benefit the most from federal tax subsidies for housing.
10
 On the other 
hand, the majority of low-income taxpayers, regardless of race, and the 
majority of African-American taxpayers, regardless of class, are the least 
likely to benefit from federal tax subsidies for housing.
11
 Given the near 
collapse of our housing industry, now may be the time to re-think the 
government‘s generous federal tax subsidies for homeownership.  
It is estimated that for fiscal year 2009, the loss in tax revenue from the 
tax subsidies for housing will be in excess of $207 billion.
12
 Adding insult 
to injury, economists agree that virtually no one buys a house because of 
those tax subsidies, but the subsidies do increase the cost of housing.
13
 
Federal tax subsidies for homeownership are expensive and inefficient, 
with race and class key determinants of their receipt. Finally, 
homeownership increases wealth disparities by race in America.
14
 
Therefore, the current subsidies for homeownership are too costly to retain 
in their present form.  
 
 
 10. See infra Part IV.E. This is true because middle- and upper-income taxpayers are most likely 
to be homeowners than any other racial or ethnic group and eligible to itemize their deductions. 
 11. See infra Part III.C. This is true because low-income homeowners are most likely to sell their 
homes for a non-deductible loss, blacks are more likely to be renters ineligible for federal tax 
subsidies, and blacks who are homeowners are less likely to benefit from tax provisions that reward 
valuable homes with significant equity appreciation. 
 12. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007, 288 (Author‘s calculations: $94.5 billion (mortgage interest); 
$12.8 billion (real property taxes); $59.9 billion (exclusion of gain on sale of residence); and $40.6 
(exclusion for net imputed rental income) for a total of $207.8 billion.).  
 13. See, e.g., William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging 
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1171 (June 18, 2007) (―Evidence 
suggests, however, that the mortgage interest deduction . . . does little if anything to encourage 
homeownership. Instead, it serves mainly to raise the price of housing and land and to encourage 
people who do buy homes to borrow more and to buy larger homes than they otherwise would.‖); 
Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 
TAX POL‘Y & ECON. 37, 39 (2003) (―While the deduction appears to increase the amount spent on 
housing, it also appears to have almost no effect on the homeownership rate.‖); Roberta F. Mann, The 
(Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1391 (2000) (―None of the evidence from economists or from other countries 
suggests that the repeal of the home mortgage interest deduction would reduce demand for owner 
occupied housing or home ownership rates.‖); Roger Lowenstein, Who Needs the Mortgage-Interest 
Deduction?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 78 (―Economists don‘t agree on much, but 
they do agree on this: the interest deduction doesn‘t do a thing for homeownership rates. If you 
eliminated the deduction tomorrow, America would have the same number of homeowners . . . .‖).  
 14. Cf. Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, The Transition to Home Ownership and the Black-
White Wealth Gap, 84 REV. ECON. STAT. 281, 281 (2002) (―Given the strong historical association 
between home ownership and wealth, it is likely that the racial wealth gap derives, at least partially, 
from the large observed racial differences in housing wealth.‖); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 68 (―Just as 
home ownership creates wealth for both whites and blacks, it simultaneously widens the racial wealth 
gap under current conditions.‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Part II begins by discussing the literature demonstrating that tax 
subsidies encourage virtually no one to purchase a house. The tax 
subsidies benefit those who were already going to buy homes. The 
literature does conclude, however, that tax benefits increase the cost of 
housing and taxpayers purchase more expensive homes than they would 
without the tax benefits. Part II then briefly describes the well-known 
federal tax benefits associated with homeownership: deductions for 
mortgage interest and real property taxes,
15
 an exclusion from income of 
the imputed rental value of our homes,
16
 and an exclusion from income of 
the gain on the sale of our personal residence.
17
 
Part III provides a class-based analysis of federal tax benefits for 
homeownership. Most low-income taxpayers are not homeowners and are 
not eligible for federal tax benefits. For those low-income taxpayers who 
are homeowners, many do not itemize deductions and thus cannot receive 
the benefits of the mortgage interest deduction, which has been included in 
the price of the asset that they have purchased. Increased housing costs 
caused by the tax subsidy make it more difficult for low-income taxpayers 
to buy homes. In addition, low-income homeowners often sell their homes 
at a loss and cannot deduct that loss. On the other hand, middle- and 
upper-income taxpayers—regardless of race—are most likely to become 
homeowners and most likely to itemize deductions; however, they may be 
subject to the alternative minimum tax and lose a portion of their real 
property tax deductions. Further, upper-income taxpayers are most likely 
to benefit from the exclusion of imputed rental income as well as the 
exclusion from gain on the sale of their personal residence. 
Part IV provides a race-based analysis of federal tax benefits for 
homeownership. Tax laws disadvantage black taxpayers and other 
taxpayers of color in three different ways.
18
 First, tax laws only benefit 
homeowners, and whites are far more likely to be homeowners than any 
other racial or ethnic group.
19
 Second, the housing market penalizes 
neighborhoods where more than 10% of the homeowners are black, while 
the housing market gives a bonus to neighborhoods where homeowners 
 
 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. The Article attempts to address the racial and ethnic effects of federal tax law on all racial 
and ethnic groups. In certain instances, the Article focuses on black and white taxpayers because of the 
wealth of empirical data that exists for black and white homeowners that does not exist for other 
groups.  
 19. See infra Part IV.B. 
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are at least 90% white.
20
 Most black homeowners live in majority black 
neighborhoods, and most white homeowners live in majority white 
neighborhoods.
21
 As a result, there is an effective cap on the appreciation 
for black homes when compared with their white counterparts living in 
90% white neighborhoods.
22
 Federal tax policy‘s exclusion from income 
for the gain on the sale of their homes will always disadvantage blacks 
who, unlike Chris Rock, do not live in 90% white neighborhoods when 
compared to their white counterparts who do. Finally, the exclusion for 
imputed rent will similarly be worth more the more the home is worth. 
Given that there is an effective cap on the value of black homes that are 
not in overwhelmingly white neighborhoods when compared to white 
homes that are, the exclusion will be worth more to middle- and upper-
income white homeowners who live in overwhelmingly white 
neighborhoods than middle- and upper-income black homeowners who do 
not. This Part also discusses blogosphere comments about earlier drafts of 
the Article. 
Part V provides three solutions to the race- and class-based problems 
identified herein. It begins with a critique of prior articles that have 
analyzed housing tax subsidies from a race
23
 and/or class
24
 perspective. 
The critique shows that proposed solutions either ignore the race-based 
discrimination faced by homeowners of color, or would make things worse 
for black homeowners. Part V then offers three different solutions which 
 
 
 20. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. This 10% cap only seems to apply to the percentage 
of blacks living in the neighborhood and not to Hispanics, Asians, or Native Americans. See Rusk, 
supra note 4, at 4 (Table 2 showing no statistical significance in the differences in racial neighborhood 
composition except for blacks.). 
 21. See supra note 2.  
 22. See Katherine A. Kiel & Jeffrey E. Zabel, House Price Differentials in U.S. Cities: 
Household and Neighborhood Racial Effects, 5 J. HOUSING ECON. 143, 156 (1996) (authors studied 
housing appreciation in Chicago, Denver, and Philadelphia and found housing appreciation was 
limited for minority homeowners in Chicago and Philadelphia, but not Denver); Sunwoong Kim, Race 
and Home Price Appreciation in Urban Neighborhoods: Evidence from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 28 
REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 9, 9 (2000) (―In this paper, we provide strong empirical evidence that the 
neighborhoods that are heavily resided in by racial minorities experience low appreciation rates in the 
long run.‖). 
 23. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 13, at 1365–66 (2000) (describing race and class impact of the 
mortgage interest deduction); Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal 
Revenue Code, 1996 WISC. L. REV. 751, 780 (describing racial impact of the mortgage interest 
deduction); Mylinh Uy, Comment, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian Americans, 11 ASIAN L.J. 117, 
124–27 (2004) (describing racial impact of the mortgage interest deduction).  
 24. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 13, at 1360–62 nn.67–90 and accompanying text (describing 
class effects of the mortgage interest deduction); Leo P. Martinez, ―To Lay and Collect Taxes‖: The 
Constitutional Case for Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL‘Y REV. 111, 150 n.280 (1999) 
(―regressive deductions, like the mortgage interest deduction, tend to make progressive rate structures 
less progressive.‖).  
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will better target reform to those low-income and black middle- and upper-
income homeowners currently disadvantaged by federal tax policies.  
First, refundable credits should be available for housing to insure low-
income homeowners who have purchased an asset with the tax deduction 
built into the price will be able to receive a tax benefit. Second, losses on 
the sale of personal residences for low-income homeowners should be 
allowed to offset ordinary income. Third, housing tax benefits should only 
be allowed for homes in ―racially diverse‖ neighborhoods. Instead of 
reinforcing the race-based discrimination currently existing in the housing 
market, tax law should counteract it. A tax subsidy for homeowners in 
―racially diverse‖ neighborhoods would make homes in those 
neighborhoods more valuable as compensation for the earlier market 
penalty. The Article concludes by noting that, to the extent that tax 
policies are imposing a barrier to homeownership on the basis of race 
and/or class, those policies must change. These extreme financial times 
call for extreme reform measures. 
II. FEDERAL TAX SUBSIDIES FOR HOUSING 
A. Tax Benefits Increase the Cost of Homeownership, But Do Not Impact 
the Decision to Purchase A Home 
Numerous articles have examined the tax benefits associated with 
housing.
25
 Since the beginning of our income tax until the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, all interest was deductible.
26
 While the legislative history on the 
allowance of personal interest is sparse, when Congress amended the 
Internal Revenue Code to continue to allow the mortgage interest 
deduction in 1986, while disallowing, for example, a deduction for credit 
card interest payments, it cited encouraging homeownership as 
justification
27
 notwithstanding the empirical data that shows that tax 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 13, at 1361 (―The home mortgage interest deduction thus 
constitutes an upside-down subsidy—the greater the need, the smaller the subsidy.‖) (citation omitted); 
William T. Mathias, Curtailing the Economic Distortions of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 30 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 43 (1996) (describing tax benefits of the mortgage interest deduction); Mark 
Andrew Snider, The Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. 
KY. L. REV. 157 (2005) (describing tax benefits of the mortgage interest deduction for suburban 
homeowners as opposed to urban homeowners). 
 26. Mathias, supra note 25, at 45 (―From the inception of the income tax in 1913 until the 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 . . . the general rule was that a taxpayer could deduct all 
personal interest payments, including interest payments on home mortgages.‖); see also Joseph A. 
Snoe, My Home, My Debt: Remodeling the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 80 KY. L.J. 431, 436–
38 (1992) (describing the Tax Reform Act changes to interest deductions). 
 27. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
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benefits generally do not encourage taxpayers to purchase homes, but 
encourage taxpayers to purchase bigger, more expensive homes.
 
 
Generally, whether homeowners will purchase more expensive homes 
is largely a function of supply and demand. The more inelastic the supply, 
the more the mortgage interest deduction will result in a price increase. If 
housing stock is fixed, the mortgage interest deduction increases the price 
of housing by 10%.
28
 The price increase will be greatest in areas with high 
tax rates and high housing prices.
29
 Generally, it is believed that the 
deductions for mortgage interest and property taxes are built into the price 
thus increasing the costs of housing.
30
 The market, however, has trouble 
distinguishing between taxpayers who receive different tax benefits from 
the mortgage interest deduction and increases the cost based on the highest 
benefit that could be received.
31
 
Time-series studies in the United States show that the mortgage interest 
deduction does not influence the decision to purchase a home.
32
 Even 
though the last forty years have presented a significant fluctuation in the 
inflation rate and tax rates, the homeownership rate has moved very 
little.
33
 Nevertheless, homeownership is a tax-favored investment in 
America.  
 
 
REFORM ACT OF 1986 263–64 (Comm. Print 1987) (―Congress nevertheless determined that 
encouraging home ownership is an important policy goal, achieved in part by providing a deduction 
for residential mortgage interest.‖); Mathias, supra note 25, at 73 (―When Congress fashioned the 
current rules for the mortgage interest deduction, its stated goal was to foster home ownership.‖) 
(citation omitted).  
 28. See Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1179 (one study using a ―fixed stock of housing (completely 
inelastic supply) . . . estimate[s] that the [mortgage interest deduction] increases the price of housing 
by about 10 percent.‖). 
 29. Id. (―The increases are greatest in areas with high tax rates and house prices.‖). 
 30. See Mathias, supra note 25, at 64 (―[T]here seems to be general agreement that some portion 
of the mortgage interest deduction is capitalized into the market price of owner-occupied housing, 
there is no agreement on the extent to which the deduction is capitalized.‖); see also Eric Kades, 
Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1501 n.20 (1999) (―[T]he mortgage interest deduction has made homes 
more valuable and has undoubtedly been capitalized into home prices.‖). Cf. Martin J. McMahon, Jr., 
Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 459, 486 (1993) (suggesting that the mortgage interest deduction is mostly capitalized into 
the price of a home). 
 31. Mathias, supra note 25, at 64 (―The market has trouble distinguishing between taxpayers who 
receive different levels of benefit from the mortgage interest deduction based on their marginal tax rate 
and so the market price for housing tends to reflect the highest benefit received from the deduction.‖). 
 32. See Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1180 (―Time-series evidence in the U.S. provides little 
reason to believe that the [mortgage interest deduction] has a substantial influence on 
homeownership.‖). 
 33. Id. (―Despite substantial variation in the values of inflation and itemization—and thus the 
[mortgage interest deduction]—over the past 40 years, the homeownership rate has barely budged 
. . . .‖). 
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B. Federal Tax Laws Significantly Subsidize Homeownership 
Homeowners are allowed to deduct from their income their mortgage 
interest expenses
34
 and real property taxes
35
 in computing their tax 
liability,
36
 yet imputed rental income (the income the homeowner would 
receive if she rented her house to a tenant at fair market value) is excluded 
from income.
37
 If the imputed rental income were taxable, then taxpayers 
would be taxed on amounts they never actually receive. In addition, the 
more valuable the home, the higher the imputed income taxes due.  
The mortgage interest deduction is allowed on a primary and/or 
secondary home as long as the mortgage does not exceed $1 million. 
Although mortgage interest is deducted in computing taxable income, rent 
is not deductible.
38
 When we sell our homes, some (or all)
39
 of the gain is 
 
 
 34. I.R.C. § 163(h) (2007). Generally, personal interest cannot be deducted; however, there is an 
exception for ―qualified residence interest.‖ The interest can be deducted on a mortgage (or mortgages) 
not to exceed $1 million and a home equity loan (or loans) not to exceed $100,000. Id. In addition, 
taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of $100,000 or less are allowed to deduct premiums paid or 
accrued for qualified mortgage insurance for mortgage insurance contracts entered into on or after 
January 1, 2007, and amounts paid or accrued before January 1, 2008. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(E) (2007). 
For households with adjusted gross incomes greater than $100,000, the amount of the deduction 
phases out. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(E)(ii). 
 35. I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (2007). 
 36. Recently, Congress phased out the limits on itemized deductions that previously faced 
middle- and upper-income taxpayers under I.R.C. § 68 (2007). See Reed Shuldiner & David Shakow, 
Lessons From The Limitation on Itemized Deductions, 93 TAX NOTES 673, 679 (2001) (―The most 
important change in the 2001 Act affecting section 68 is obviously the phasedown and repeal of the 
provision. The 2001 Act reduces the section 68 limitation by one-third for 2006 and 2007 and two-
thirds for 2008 and 2009. The act repeals sections 68 for 2010 and reinstates section 68 as currently 
enacted for 2011 and beyond.‖). In addition, although the mortgage interest deduction and real 
property tax deduction are itemized deductions, they are not subject to the 2% floor that most other 
itemized deductions are subject to. I.R.C. § 67 (2007). They may be on their way back given the 
Obama administration‘s budget proposal to limit the tax benefit for itemized deductions to families 
earning more than $250,000 and singles earning more than $200,000. Jackie Calmes and Robert Pear, 
Obama to Call for Higher Tax on Top Earners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A1 (―President Obama 
will propose further tax increases on the affluent . . . calling for stricter limits on the benefits of 
itemized deductions taken by the wealthiest households . . . .‖). 
 37. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New 
Look At Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1909 n.10 (1987) (―The nontaxation of imputed 
rental income is without specific statutory or case authority but is nonetheless a fundamental feature of 
the present tax law.‖ (citing 1 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 
¶ 5.3.3 (1981))); Mann, supra note 13, at 1348–49 (―The Federal income tax system subsidizes the 
dream of home ownership through the home mortgage interest deduction, the property tax deduction, 
and the exclusion of imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing, as well as other forms of 
preferential treatment.‖) (citations omitted). 
 38. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(3) (―Expenses of maintaining a household, including amounts 
paid for rent . . . are not deductible.‖). 
 39. I.R.C. § 121 (2007) (allowing exclusion for gain on sale of principal residence of up to 
$500,000 for married couples filing a joint return and $250,000 for everyone else). 
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excluded from our income, and—if any of the gain is taxed—it is taxed at 
the lower capital gains rate.
40
 If we sell our homes at a loss, however, that 
loss is not recognized.
41
 In addition, the alternative minimum tax can 
operate in a way that takes away certain housing benefits. It is estimated 
that for fiscal year 2009, the loss in tax revenue from those tax advantages 
exceeded $207 billion.  
III. CLASS AND HOMEOWNERSHIP TAX BENEFITS 
A. Introduction 
This part makes two primary points. First, who is a homeowner is a 
function of class. Second, who receives tax benefits for homeownership is 
a function of class. The greater a taxpayer‘s income, the more beneficial 
any tax deduction. The greater a taxpayer‘s income, the higher the 
likelihood that the taxpayer will be a homeowner. As we saw earlier, 
because the price of the tax deduction is included in the price of housing, 
federal tax policies, by increasing housing costs, make it harder for low-
income taxpayers to become homeowners.  
B. Homeownership Rates by Income Levels 
Low-income homeownership rates have increased over the last decade. 
Between 1993 and 2000, the number of low-income homeowners grew by 
79%.
42
 As income rises, homeownership rates also rise.
43
 Table 3.1 below 
provides a more complete picture. 
 
 
 40. I.R.C. § 1221(a) provides that a personal residence is a capital asset. I.R.C. § 1222 provides 
that gain on the sale or exchange of a capital asset is capital gain. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2007) provides 
reduced rates for capital gains. 
 41. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.165-9(a); see Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(4) (as 
amended in 1972). 
 42. See Anne B. Shlay, Low-Income Homeownership: American Dream or Delusion?, 43 URB. 
STUD. 511, 516 (2006). 
 43. Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1172. 
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TABLE 3.1
44
 
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME, 2003 (%) 
Income Range All Households 
< $5,000 48.9 
$5–$9,999 39.4 
$10–14,999 46.7 
$15–19,999 47.0 
$20–24,999 49.5 
$25–29,999 43.5 
$30–34,999 54.2 
$35–39,999 55.9 
$40–49,999 61.2 
$50–59,999 69.5 
$60–69,999 75.1 
$70–79,999 79.0 
$80–99,999 85.0 
$100–119,999 88.7 
> $119,999 92.1 
Table 3.1 shows that once income reaches $30,000, the majority of all 
households are homeowners. When income reaches $80,000, 85% of all 
households are homeowners, and once income reaches $120,000, 92% of 
all households are homeowners. Given that tax deductions benefit 
taxpayers with the highest marginal tax rates, high-income households, 
which are most likely to be homeowners, are also the most likely to 
benefit from the tax subsidy. Homeownership has wealth implications as 
well. 
All homeowners have 48% of their net worth represented by their 
homes. Low-income homeowners have 80% of their net worth represented 
by their homes and upper-income homeowners have 26% of their net 
worth represented by their homes.
45
 Home equity, therefore, is a 
 
 
 44. Id. at 1174.  
 45. See Michael A. Stegman, Allison Freeman & Jong-Gyu Paik, Home Equity and Other 
Differences in the Wealth of Low-and Moderate-Income Homeowners: A Work in Progress 4 (Sept. 
19–21, 2006) (draft Prepared for Presentation and Discussion at Federal Reserve Bank/CFED Asset 
Learning Conference, available at http://www.frbsf.org/community/research/assets/HomeEquityand 
OtherDifferencesinWealth.pdf) (―Among [lowest income households], home equity accounted for 80-
percent of their net worth, compared to 48-percent for owners in the middle quintile and 26-percent for 
those in the highest quintile.‖). 
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significant part of low-income net worth, less significant for the typical 
non-low-income homeowner, and a very insignificant part of upper-
income net worth. Put another way, low-income homeowners have 
virtually all of their net worth tied up in their homes, while upper-income 
homeowners have very little net worth tied up in their homes. 
C. Tax Benefits and Class 
Because the tax structure is a progressive rate structure, deductions are 
more valuable the higher your taxable income.
46
 For example, a taxpayer 
in the 35% marginal tax bracket saves 35 cents for every dollar of 
mortgage interest deduction. Her after-tax costs of a $1 mortgage payment 
would be 65 cents. On the other hand, a taxpayer in the 15% marginal tax 
bracket saves 15 cents for every dollar of mortgage interest deduction. Her 
after tax-costs of a $1 mortgage payment would be 85 cents. This is true of 
every tax deduction; however, this is especially troublesome in the area of 
homeownership because, as we have just seen, owning a home is itself 
skewed by class. 
All homeowners benefit from the exclusion from income for the rental 
value of their homes. But the higher your marginal tax rate, the greater 
your benefit. Low-income homeowners do not benefit as much as higher 
income homeowners. Deductions for housing tell a different story. 
However, not everyone who owns a home benefits from the tax 
deductions for homeownership. Only taxpayers who itemize their 
deductions are eligible to receive the mortgage interest and real property 
deductions and two-thirds of taxpayers do not itemize.
47
 Moreover, the 
mortgage interest deduction disadvantages low-income homeowners.
48
  
 
 
 46. See, e.g., James R. Follain & David C. Ling, The Federal Tax Subsidy to Housing and the 
Reduced Value of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 44 NAT‘L TAX J. 147, 157 (2003) (―The 
distribution of the subsidy is highly skewed toward high income households. Those in the top three 
income classes, about 12 percent of the household population, receive about 54 percent of the subsidy 
to owner-occupants.‖). 
 47. Richard Davies, Standard Deduction Vs. Itemizing, ABCNEWS.COM, Mar. 9, 2004, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Taxguide/story?id=86114&page=1 (―If you‘re among the two-thirds 
of taxpayers who do not itemize . . .‖); see also William G. Gale & Leonard E. Burman, A Preliminary 
Evaluation of the Tax Reform Panel‘s Report, 109 TAX NOTES 1349, 1354 (2005). Authors Gale and 
Burman provide: ―Many middle-income homeowners do not itemize deductions, and even those who 
do itemize may receive less benefit because their itemized deductions scarcely exceed the standard 
deduction.‖ Id. They cite the following example:  
[A] family donates $1,000 to charity, pays $3,000 in state and local taxes, and pays $7,000 in 
mortgage interest. Because the family‘s total itemized deductions of $11,000 exceed the 
standard deduction of $10,300, it would itemize, but owning the home reduces taxable 
income only by $700 ($11,000 minus the $10,300 standard deduction that they could claim if 
they did not own a home). At a 15 percent marginal rate, the subsidy will amount to 1.5 
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Taxpayers who take the standard deduction on their tax returns reap no 
benefit from their mortgage interest payments, even though they have 
―paid‖ for them in the purchase price of their homes. The standard 
deduction is available for all taxpayers—regardless of whether they own 
homes. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
49
 low-income taxpayers are 
less likely to receive those benefits because they are less likely to itemize 
their deductions. Instead, these taxpayers take the standard deduction 
because it is a larger amount than their deductions and may not benefit 
from their mortgage interest payments.
50
 Itemization is a function of how 
 
 
percent of interest paid. By comparison, a taxpayer in the 35 percent bracket who would 
itemize even if he did not own a home (for example, because of state and local taxes) would 
receive a subsidy equal to 35 percent of interest paid, or more than 20 times as much as the 
moderate-income family. 
Id. at 1354 n.8; see also Edward P. Lazear & James Poterba, Reforming Taxes to Promote Economic 
Growth, 110 TAX NOTES 387 (2006) (―Many homeowners who do not currently itemize their 
deductions will receive tax relief under [reform proposals].‖); NICOLAS P. RETSINAS & ERIC S. 
BELSKY, EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL, IN LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE 
UNEXAMINED GOAL 8 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2002) (Low-income homeowners 
―do not benefit from the deduction of mortgage interest payments and real estate taxes . . . [because] 
the mortgages and property taxes of low-income [home] owners are often too small to make it pay to 
itemize their deductions, so they forgo itemizing them in favor of taking the standard deduction.‖). But 
see Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform, Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 
687, 716 (1999) (―In addition, those taxpayers most likely to itemize their personal deductions are 
homeowners who claim home mortgage interest expenses and property taxes, or those living in areas 
that adopt high state and local income taxes, namely, the more wealthy.‖) (citation omitted).  
 48. My previous scholarship has shown that certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
disadvantage blacks, Latinos, Asians, and low-income taxpayers. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race 
and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 790 (2007) (discussing discriminatory treatment 
received by low-income taxpayers regardless of race); Dorothy A. Brown, Pensions and Risk 
Aversion: The Influence of Race, Ethnicity, and Class on Investor Behavior, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 385 (2007) [hereinafter Risk Aversion] (showing how blacks and Latinos who participate in their 
defined contribution pension plans are significantly less likely to invest in the stock market than whites 
and as a result will retire with lower account balances at retirement); Dorothy A. Brown, Tax 
Treatment of Children: Separate But Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755 (2005) [hereinafter Tax Treatment] 
(comparing the earned income tax credit and the child tax credit and showing how middle-class white 
children receive tax benefits and low-income children of all races do not); Dorothy A. Brown, 
Pensions, Risk and Race, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (2004) [hereinafter Pensions] (showing how 
blacks, Latinos, and Asians are less likely to participate in their employer provided pension plan and 
receive the tax benefits); Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax Literature: 
The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469 (1997) (showing that the marriage penalty 
disadvantages blacks and the marriage bonus advantages whites—except for white married couples 
earning $60,000–$90,000 who are the most likely to pay the marriage penalty).  
 49. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.  
 50. James R. Follain, David C. Ling & Gary A. McGill, The Preferential Income Tax Treatment 
of Owner-Occupied Housing: Who Really Benefits?, 4 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE 1, 21 (1993) (―[T]he 
mortgage interest deduction [is] worthless, or nearly so, for many low-and moderate-income 
households . . . .‖). Cf. Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1171 (―Most tax return filers, especially those with 
low or moderate incomes, do not itemize their deductions and therefore are not in a position to take 
advantage of the deduction if they were to buy a home.‖); Francine J. Lipman, Taxing Undocumented 
Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and Without Representation, 59 TAX LAW. 813, 839 n.187 (2006) 
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much the taxpayer actually spends versus how much the standard 
deduction is. The taxpayer will choose the greater amount, and—at lower 
income levels—it is typical that taxpayers spend less than the standard 
deduction. New homeowners are generally in low- or middle-income 
households that do not itemize.
51
 On the other hand, middle- and upper-
income taxpayers may have their mortgage interest and/or property tax 
deduction limited or eliminated by the alternative minimum tax.
52
  
The two-thirds of taxpayers who do not itemize, however, is not what 
is important for our purposes. The percentage of taxpayers who are 
homeowners and still paying mortgage interest is the relevant taxpayer 
group. Slightly more than half (54%) of taxpayers who pay interest on 
their mortgages receive a tax benefit.
53
 That means just under half (46%) 
of homeowners who pay mortgage interest do not receive a tax benefit 
from their interest payments. Yet, because the mortgage interest deduction 
is at least in part built into the price of the home, many low-income 
homeowners are paying for a tax benefit that they never receive.
54
 The vast 
majority of taxpayers receiving the tax benefit are higher income taxpayers 
as table 3.2 below demonstrates.
55
  
 
 
(citing WEST FEDERAL TAXATION: COMPREHENSIVE VOLUME 2–7 (Eugene Willis et al. eds., 2005) 
(―Although taxpayers can make an election to itemize their deductions in lieu of the standard 
deduction, approximately 70% of all taxpayers, including almost all low-income taxpayers, take the 
standard deduction.‖)). 
 51. Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1179.  
 52. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle America Burns: Amending the Amt 
(And Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 856 (2004) (―Various items must be recomputed for AMT 
purposes, including home mortgage interest . . . .‖); Stewart E. Sterk & Mitchell L. Engler, Property 
Tax Reassessment: Who Needs It?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1037, 1057 n.80 (2006) (―[T]he federal 
alternative minimum tax (AMT), which disallows the property tax deduction in certain cases.‖). The 
extent of the limitation is dependent upon a number of factors and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 53. PRESIDENT‘S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: 
PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA‘S TAX SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT 74 (2005), available at http://govinfo. 
library.unt.edu/taxreformpanel/final-report/index.html [hereinafter PRESIDENT‘S REPORT]. One reason 
why taxpayers do not receive a tax benefit from their mortgage interest payments is because they do 
not itemize their deductions but take the standard deduction, which in their circumstances would be 
greater. See I.R.C. § 63 (2007). 
 54. Mathias, supra note 25, at 64 (―[T]he mortgage interest deduction is over-capitalized for 
some taxpayers . . . .‖). 
 55. Adjusted gross income is defined as gross income less certain deductions. See I.R.C. § 62 
(2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
344 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:329 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.2
56
 
PERCENT OF HOMEOWNERS WHO RECEIVE A TAX BENEFIT FROM THE 
MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BY ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME 
Income Range Percent 
All 54 
0–$15,000  2 
$15–30,000 16 
$30–40,000 34 
$40–50,000 49 
$50–60,000 58 
$60–75,000 71 
$75–100,000 90 
$100–200,000 97 
$200–500,000 99 
$500–1 million 98 
> $1 million 97 
Table 3.2 shows that only 2% of taxpayers with adjusted gross income 
(AGI) less than $15,000 receive a tax benefit from their mortgage 
payments. That means that 98% of taxpayers with an AGI less than 
$15,000 receive no tax benefit from homeownership. Furthermore, only 
16% of taxpayers with an AGI between $15,000 and $30,000 receive a tax 
benefit from their mortgage interest payments. Similarly, 84% of 
taxpayers with an AGI between $15,000 and $30,000 receive no tax 
benefit from homeownership.  
Only 34% of taxpayers earning between $30,000 and $40,000 receive a 
tax benefit from homeownership, which means 66% do not receive a tax 
benefit. For taxpayers with income levels between $40,000 and $50,000, 
49% of taxpayers receive a tax benefit from homeownership, which means 
51% also receive no benefit. Put another way, the vast majority of 
 
 
 56. PRESIDENT‘S REPORT, supra note 53, at 74 (see figure 5.7). Similar results were obtained 
from a study based on nonfarm households in the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances. See James 
Poterba & Todd Sinai, Tax Expenditures for Owner-Occupied Housing: Deductions for Property 
Taxes and Mortgage Interest and the Exclusion of Imputed Rental Income, 98 AMER. ECON. REV. 84, 
85 (2008) (study shows: (i) 23% of homeowners in households with less than $40,000 of household 
income itemize; (ii) 66% of homeowners in households $40,000–74,999 itemize; (iii) 86% of 
homeowners in households $125,000–250,000 itemize; and (iv) 99.9% of homeowners in households 
greater than $250,000 itemize). 
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homeowners earning $50,000 or less do not receive tax benefits from their 
mortgage interest payments. 
Table 3.2 shows that when AGI reaches $75,000, however, 90% of 
taxpayers receive the tax benefit of their mortgage interest payments.
57
 
Once AGI reaches $100,000, at least 97% of taxpayers receive a tax 
benefit from their mortgage interest payments. So taxpayers with AGIs of 
$100,000 as well as taxpayers with AGIs in excess of $1 million have the 
same percentage receiving tax benefits from their mortgage interest 
payments, namely 97%. Tax benefits for housing are overwhelmingly 
received by higher AGI households.
58
  
Another way in which low-income homeowners do not benefit from 
federal tax policies that encourage homeownership is the way in which 
losses from the sale of personal residences are treated. Losses from the 
sale of personal residences are not allowed as deductions from income, the 
way losses from the sales of capital assets can be deducted—albeit to a 
limited extent—against ordinary income.59 Many low-income 
homeowners sell their homes for less than what they paid for them.
60
 Low-
income homeowners do not remain homeowners like their higher-income 
counterparts and return to renting at extremely high rates.
61
 
Homeownership may be a poor asset for low-income individuals to invest 
in because of its low return when compared with other investments.
62
 
Gaining wealth from homeownership occurs from the sale of the second 
house (and subsequent houses).
63
 Low-income homeowners who sell their 
first house and return to renting do not reap significant benefits from 
homeownership.
64
 Low-income homeowners also do not benefit 
significantly from the exclusion from income for gain from the sale of 
their personal residences because they do not receive significant gains 
from these sales.
65
  
 
 
 57. Cf. Steven Bourassa & William Grigsby, Income Tax Concessions for Owner-Occupied 
Housing, 11 HOUSING POL‘Y DEBATE 521, 531 (2000) (―Fully 90 percent of the benefit goes to 
homeowners with incomes over $50,000 a year because most low-and moderate-income homeowners 
find that taking the standard deduction is more advantageous than itemizing expenses.‖). 
 58. Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1177–78 (Study shows that ―households in the lowest 60 percent 
of the income distribution obtain only 3 percent of the [mortgage interest deduction tax] benefits.‖). 
 59. See I.R.C. §§ 1211, 1212, 165(c) (2007). 
 60. Shlay, supra note 42, at 519. 
 61. Id. at 519–20. 
 62. Id. at 520 (―[E]ncouraging homeownership among low-income families will only increase 
the wealth gap in the United States.‖). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Cf. Deborah Kenn, Paradise Unfound: The American Dream of Housing Justice For All, 5 
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 69, 84 (1995) (―The american dream of homeownership is premised upon a 
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Also, those at the low-income levels would be most helped by a rent 
deduction, because they are the most likely not to itemize their deductions 
otherwise. (However, as described below, a tax deduction for rent would 
most likely result in higher rental prices).
66
 Therefore, low-income 
taxpayers, regardless of race, are the most likely to be harmed by the non-
deductibility of rent provisions in existing federal tax policy. 
Finally, the exclusion for imputed rent benefits high-income 
households the most for two reasons. First, those at the highest marginal 
tax rate receive the greatest tax benefit from the exclusion (as they did 
from the deduction). Second, one would expect the amount of the imputed 
rent to be the greatest for the most expensive homes, which would be 
those owned by high-income homeowners.  
D. Summary 
Tax benefits are skewed towards higher-income taxpayers who would 
buy houses even without the tax subsidies. One reason is a function of our 
progressive tax rate structure, which makes deductions more valuable as 
income rises. Thus, there is more incentive for higher-income taxpayers to 
find deductions which federal tax laws permit. (Of course there is also an 
incentive for taxpayers to find exclusions which federal tax laws permit.) 
For example, the exclusion for imputed rental income significantly 
benefits higher-income taxpayers who are excluding more imputed rental 
income than their lower-income counterparts.  
The most important way in which tax benefits discriminate against 
low-income homeowners is by disallowing deductions for mortgage 
interest if the taxpayer does not itemize. The low-income homeowner has 
purchased a home that is priced higher because the deduction is built into 
its price, yet he or she is prevented from taking the deduction because the 
tax laws do not permit non-itemized deductions for mortgage interest or 
property tax deductions. 
Tax subsidies also benefit higher-income taxpayers because only 
homeownership is encouraged—not housing more generally. 
Homeownership has a built-in class bias: the more income you earn, the 
more likely you are to be able to afford and own a house. Therefore, tax 
policies for housing significantly benefit higher-income taxpayers. The 
 
 
significant return on investment and appreciation of housing dollars. Limiting the appreciation, 
therefore, limits a homeowner‘s ability to improve his own housing situation and generates a second 
class form of homeownership for the poor.‖).  
 66. See infra Part V.B.4.  
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overwhelming majority of low-income taxpayers who pay mortgage 
interest are not able to receive a tax benefit from homeownership. The 
President‘s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform showed that taxpayers 
in the highest income group—those who made more than $200,000—
received more than eight times the benefit as those in the group making 
between $50,000 and $75,000.
67
 Similarly, real property tax deductions 
only benefit taxpayers who itemize, and the greater their income, the 
greater the tax benefit received. However, at the higher income levels, the 
alternative minimum tax takes back some of the tax subsidy for the real 
property tax deduction.  
Tax benefits exclude gains, but prohibit losses on the sale of homes. 
Low-income homeowners are most likely to sell their homes at a non-
deductible loss. This is another way that housing tax benefits are skewed 
towards higher-income taxpayers. 
IV. RACE AND HOMEOWNERSHIP TAX BENEFITS 
A. Introduction 
This part illustrates how being a homeowner is also a function of race, 
and in many instances, how race matters more than class. In order to be 
eligible for housing tax subsidies, a taxpayer must first be a homeowner. 
Data show that at every income level there is a greater percentage of white 
homeowners than black homeowners—even for middle- and upper-income 
black homeowners. Tax benefits that support homeownership benefit 
middle- and upper- income whites far more than middle- and upper-
income blacks. This part will also show that most blacks live in 
majority/minority neighborhoods, which means that their homes are worth 
less than their white counterparts‘ homes. Further, black homes are 
generally older and of lower quality than their white counterparts‘ homes. 
This makes it likely that they will not receive the potential upside for 
appreciation that their middle- and upper-income white counterparts 
receive—unless they choose to live in overwhelmingly white 
neighborhoods. 
 
 
 67. Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1178.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
348 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:329 
 
 
 
 
B. Homeownership Rates by Race 
Federal tax policy does not have as a goal the support and/or 
encouragement of affordable housing. If it did, there would not be a $1 
million cap on mortgages, a subsidy for two homes, and rent would be 
deductible. Federal tax policy only encourages one type of housing—
homeownership. (I am excluding from this discussion tax benefits for 
commercial real estate). This part begins by looking at renters by 
race/ethnicity to consider those ineligible for the tax benefits associated 
with homeownership. 
CHART 4.1 
PERCENTAGE OWNER/RENTER
68
 
This chart shows that the majority of whites (76%) and Asians (61%) 
are homeowners, while the majority of blacks (52%) and Latinos (51%) 
are not. Therefore, the majority of blacks and Latinos are renters.
69
  
 
 
 68. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SERIES NO. H-150-05, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE 
UNITED STATES: 2005 42, tbl. 2-1 (2006), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/h150-
05.pdf. The categories are: (i) white, non-Hispanic; (ii) black, non-Hispanic; (iii) Hispanic of any race; 
and (iv) Asian alone. 
 69. Id. Renters have significantly less wealth than homeowners. See RAKESH KOCHHAR, PEW 
HISPANIC CTR., THE WEALTH OF LATINO HOUSEHOLDS: 1996 TO 2002 20 (2004), available at 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/34.pdf (―The median net worth of non-Hispanic homeowners in 
2002 was $129,778. In contrast, the median net worth of non-Hispanic renters and others was only 
$1,526, or just over 1 percent of the wealth of homeowners . . . . In 2002, the net worth of Hispanic 
renters and others was only $762 . . . . Hispanic homeowners had a net worth of $62,839 . . . .‖) 
(citations omitted).  
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Data show that black renters are more likely not to apply for a 
mortgage when compared with white renters.
70
 Part of the explanation that 
has been proffered is that blacks fear rejection and therefore self-select not 
to apply for mortgages.
71
 
Federal tax laws that disallow deductions for rent disadvantage blacks 
and Latinos because the majority of blacks and Latinos are renters. Federal 
tax laws (which benefit homeowners) advantage whites and Asians 
because the majority of those group members are homeowners. Housing is 
raced, therefore the tax benefits associated with housing are raced.  
C. Homeownership by Race and Income 
Since World War II, homeownership has created a vibrant middle 
class.
72 
The twenty-first century has seen homeownership reach an all-time 
high with 69% of Americans owning their own homes.
73
 Homeowners can 
build up equity over time through appreciation
74
 and receive significant 
tax subsidies along the way.  
 
 
 70. Charles & Hurst, supra note 14, at 288 (―[W]hite renters were more than twice as likely than 
black renters to apply for a mortgage.‖). 
 71. Id. at 293 (―Because of what we have called the discouragement effect, there may also be an 
indirect feedback effect in that anticipating being rejected makes one less likely to apply in the first 
place.‖). 
 72. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 2, at 59 (―America has a high homeownership rate, with 69% of 
Americans owning homes. A series of federal policies that started in the 1930s made this high 
homeownership rate and subsequent middle-class wealth accumulation possible by creating a 
government-sponsored market.‖) (citation omitted); Elizabeth Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle 
Class Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 406 (2004) (―And if homeownership is the emblem of 
achieving middle class respectability, then two-thirds qualify as middle class.‖) (citations omitted); 
Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 328 (1998) (―During the post-World 
War II building boom, European countries generally built apartments, while the U.S. was transformed 
from a nation of renters to a nation of homeowners by massive tax subsidies to homeowners as well as 
the restructuring of home financing by FHA and VA mortgages.‖) (citations omitted); Adam Gordon, 
Note, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation 
Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE 
L.J. 186, 188 (2005) (―Through New Deal reforms, homeownership became the primary mechanism 
that middle-class Americans use to build assets. Today, 60% of the total assets of middle-class 
Americans are held in owner-occupied homes.‖) (citations omitted). 
 73. See Nicholas P. Retsinas, The Endangered Land of Renter-World, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 
2006, at A19 (―Today 69 percent of households own a home—an all-time high.‖). 
 74. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1195, 1203 (2002). Professor Anderson describes as follows: 
The middle class invests the largest share of its wealth in housing equity, which amounts to 
forty-three percent of white assets and sixty-three percent of black assets. Because blacks are 
confined to less-desired neighborhoods, on average the value of their housing grows less than 
that of whites. Consequently, blacks attain a substantially lower average rate of return on their 
housing investment than do whites. 
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Unlike the post-World War II housing boom,
75
 this recent 
homeownership boom included Americans of color. Black and Latino 
homeowners hold between 61% and 63% of their net worth in their homes 
and whites hold 38.5% of their net worth in their homes.
76
  
President Clinton and President Bush encouraged homeownership 
opportunities for all.
77
 Since 2002, the Bush administration touted a net 
increase of ―nearly 3 million minority homeowners.‖78 Financial industry 
executives have launched a ―with ownership, wealth‖ initiative to 
encourage homeownership among minorities.
79
 Even though progress has 
been made, homeownership rates still differ by race and/or ethnicity and 
class. A number of studies have documented racial differences in 
homeownership.
80
  
 
 
Id. (citation omitted); Shapiro, supra note 2, at 68 (―Just as home ownership creates wealth for both 
whites and blacks, it simultaneously widens the racial wealth gap under current conditions.‖). 
 75. See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 113–41 (2005) (describing 
governmental housing benefits that excluded blacks post-World War II from purchasing homes); Daria 
Roithmayer, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL‘Y & L. 197 (2004). 
 76. KOCHHAR, supra note 69, at 19. 
 77. See Michael Moss & Andrew Jacobs, Blue Skies and Green Yards, All Lost to Red Ink, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, at N1, 34–35 (―Indeed, encouraging homeownership is one of the few issues the 
Clinton and Bush administrations pursued with equal ardor.‖). 
 78. See Alphonso Jackson, U.S. Sec'y of Housing & Urban Dev., Revitalization of Uptown (Aug. 
7, 2007), http://www.nls.gov/news/speeches/2007-08-07.cfm (―The President has also set a goal of 5.5 
million new minority homeowners by decade‘s end. We‘re well on our way. Since 2002, there has 
been a net increase of nearly 3 million minority homeowners. A great success story.‖); see also Gary 
Martin, Bush Makes a Push to Boost Minority Homeowners; Blacks, Latinos Lag in Buying, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 16, 2002 (―Bush took time out of his busy tour of Republican fund-
raisers and campaign appearances to attend a White House-sponsored Conference on Minority 
Homeownership here.‖). 
 79. See Wayne Washington, Bridging the American Dream Gap: Blacks in Congress Nudge 
Lenders for Minority Buyers, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 4, 2001, at A13 (―Financial industry officials and 
members of the caucus announced plans yesterday to address some of those problems. They have 
launched an initiative, ‗With Ownership, Wealth,‘ that combines credit counseling with assistance for 
down payment and closing costs. Many mortgage lenders, including Wells Fargo Home Mortgage and 
Chase Manhattan Mortgage, will participate.‖). 
 80. See EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, 
IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS 473–501 (2005) (describes wealth inequality in America); Lisa A. Keister, 
Race and Wealth Inequality: The Impact of Racial Differences in Asset Ownership on the Distribution 
of Household Wealth, 29 SOC. SCI. RES. 477, 479 (2000) (―A number of studies have documented 
black-white differences in asset ownership, particularly homeownership.‖); Spencer Overton, But 
Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion, and Campaign Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1004–12 
(2002) (discussing racial differences in homeownership). 
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As chart 4.1 showed, whites are most likely to own their own homes 
(76%), followed by Asians (61%), Latinos (49%), and blacks (48%).
81
 
Race matters when it comes to being a homeowner. Being white makes 
you significantly more likely to own a home than if you are Asian, black, 
or Latino. (We saw in Part III that not all homeowners benefit. Low-
income homeowners do not benefit to the extent of their middle- and 
upper-income counterparts).  
Several studies show that most blacks prefer to invest in real estate, 
while most whites prefer to invest in the stock market.
82
 One might expect, 
therefore, to see a higher percentage of blacks as homeowners than 
whites—yet we do not.  
Even though Asians are more likely to be homeowners than blacks and 
Latinos, given that Asian median income is higher than white median 
income, we might expect to see even higher homeownership rates for 
Asians than whites—yet we do not.83 Consider table 4.1 below, which 
examines homeownership rates for immigrants and native-born Asians and 
found vast differences between native-born Asians and immigrants in their 
rates of homeownership.
84
  
 
 
 81. See Martin, supra note 78 (―The homeownership rate for Anglos is 74.3 percent, compared to 
48 percent for African Americans and 47.6 percent for Hispanics. Some 53.7 percent of Asian 
Americans and other races owned their own homes, the Census data revealed.‖); KOCHHAR, supra 
note 69, at 2 (―The percentage of White households who owned homes in 2002 was 74.3 percent. The 
homeownership rates for Latino and Black households were 47.3 percent and 47.7 percent 
respectively.‖). 
 82. Brown, Pensions, supra note 48, at 1536 (―Black investors think that real estate is a better 
place to invest their money than either stocks or bonds.‖) (citations omitted); see also Anthony D. 
Plath & Thomas H. Stevenson, Financial Services and the African-American Market: What Every 
Financial Planner Should Know, 94 FIN. SERVICES REV. 343, 357 (2000) (When compared with white 
households, black households ―demonstrate a distinct preference for safety and security in their 
investment preferences, favoring life insurance and real estate assets over corporate debt and equity 
securities across all levels of household income and educational attainment.‖). 
 83. See, e.g., N. Edward Coulson, Why Are Hispanic-and Asian-American Homeownership Rates 
So Low?: Immigration and Other Factors, 45 J. URB. ECON. 209, 215 (1999) (―[T]he average Hispanic 
income is very slightly higher than the average Black income, yet this does not translate into even 
slightly higher ownership rates. Similarly, average Asian income is above average White income 
which is not consistent with their low ownership tendency.‖). 
 84. CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, DONALD R. HAURIN, STUART S. ROSENTHAL & MARK DUDA, 
U.S. DEP‘T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOMEOWNERSHIP GAPS AMONG LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY 
BORROWERS AND NEIGHBORHOODS 126 (2005), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/ 
HomeownershipGapsAmongLow-IncomeAndMinority.pdf. 
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TABLE 4.1
85
 
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES FOR IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVE-BORN ASIANS 
(%) 
Racial Group All Households Immigrants Native Born 
Japanese  63 40 82 
Mainland Chinese  55 53 68 
South Asians
86
 43 44 27 
Koreans et al.
87
 39 39 29 
Other Asians  57 56 61 
Three observations are apparent from table 4.1—two of which are 
intra-racial and one is interracial. First, for Japanese, Mainland Chinese, 
and Other Asians, native-borns have a higher homeownership rate than 
immigrants. Second, South Asians and Koreans have a higher 
homeownership rate for immigrants than native-borns. Third, when the 
data from table 4.1 is compared with the data from chart 4.1, you see that 
native-born Japanese have a higher homeownership percentage (82) than 
whites (76).  
Homeownership disparities by race and ethnicity are not solely 
attributable to differences in income. Even at high income levels, a smaller 
percentage of blacks and Latinos are homeowners than whites. In 2005, 
for every income level, black homeownership rates were less than the 
overall homeownership rates by income.
88
 As income increased, however, 
the disparities narrowed. For households with incomes of $120,000 or 
greater, the gap was 4.8 percentage points, but for households with 
incomes of less than $5,000, the gap was 17 percentage points.
89
 That data 
is consistent with the results of another study based on 2003 
homeownership rates. Consider the data in table 4.2 below. 
 
 
 85. Id. (Source: 1996–1999 Current Population Survey). 
 86. South Asians include those from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Id.  
 87. This group includes those from Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Id. 
 88. Kenya Covington & Rodney Harrell, From Renting to Homeownership: Using Tax Incentives 
to Encourage Homeownership Among Renters, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 101 (2007) (―The 
homeownership gap between whites and blacks is not solely attributable to racial disparities in income. 
In 2005, at every income level, homeownership rates for black households were lower than the overall 
rates for U.S. households with equivalent incomes.‖) (citation omitted). 
 89. Id. (―At the highest income levels, the gap was significantly narrower; for example, the gap 
was 17.1 percentage points for households with annual incomes of less than $5000, but only 0.7 
percentage points for households with incomes between $100,000 and $119,999, and 4.8 percentage 
points for households with annual incomes of $120,000 or more.‖) (citation omitted). 
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TABLE 4.2
90
 
HOMEOWNERSHIP RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND INCOME, 2003 (%) 
Income Range Non-Hispanic 
White 
Non-Hispanic 
Black 
Hispanic 
< $5,000 61.9 27.5 28.3 
$5–$9,999 48.8 32.8 22.2 
$10–14,999 60.2 33.0 28.7 
$15–19,999 63.1 37.5 26.2 
$20–24,999 65.0 37.4 32.9 
$25–29,999 68.0 43.5 41.5 
$30–34,999 69.2 43.8 36.8 
$35–39,999 69.2 50.4 48.8 
$40–49,999 73.5 57.4 48.6 
$50–59,999 78.9 57.2 59.7 
$60–69,999 82.1 70.6 66.2 
$70–79,999 85.1 73.2 71.3 
$80–99,999 89.0 76.5 74.7 
$100–119,999 92.6 80.7 78.4 
> $119,999 93.1 87.6 83.5 
Five general observations can be made from the data presented in table 
4.2. First, with the exception of whites in the $5,000–$9,999 households, 
at every other household income level, the majority of whites are 
homeowners. Perhaps one explanation for this is that whites are more 
likely to receive down payment assistance from family members than 
blacks.
91
 
Second, not until black household income is at least $35,000 are the 
majority of blacks homeowners. Third, not until Latino household income 
is at least $50,000 are the majority of Latinos homeowners. Fourth, at no 
level of income are the homeownership rates equal by race and/or 
ethnicity, but the differences shrink considerably at the higher income 
 
 
 90. Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1174.  
 91. THOMAS SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW WEALTH 
PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 114 (Oxford University Press 2004); Charles & Hurst, supra note 14, at 
284 (―[B]lacks may be less able to rely on their friends, parents, and other loved ones than their white 
counterparts for assistance in generating these down payments.‖); Kerwin Kofi Charles & Erik Hurst, 
The Correlation of Wealth across Generations, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (2003) (referring to study 
which showed that at any given wealth level, black households more likely had parents with lower net 
worth levels than white households). 
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levels. Fifth, only at two different household income levels (lowest and 
$50–$59,999) is there a greater percentage of Latino homeowners than 
black homeowners. At all other income levels, a greater percentage of 
blacks are homeowners than are Latinos; although in several instances, the 
differences are minimal. Perhaps black preferences for buying real estate 
are a factor here as well. 
Latinos lag considerably behind blacks and significantly behind whites 
in their homeownership rates. For example, until household income 
reaches $25,000, whites were more than twice as likely as Latinos to be 
homeowners, but only at income levels of $5,000 or less were whites more 
than twice as likely as blacks to be homeowners. Even after controlling for 
a large number of observable factors, the black-white homeownership gap 
is smaller as income rises, but is never eliminated.
92
 The gap was between 
five and ten percentage points.
93
 
Table 4.2 shows that as income rises, so do homeownership rates—
regardless of race—which means that class matters. Table 4.2 shows that, 
even at the same income levels, there are significant differences in 
homeownership rates by race, which means that race matters more.  
Wealth is a factor as well. One study found large homeownership rate 
differences between black and white households with low wealth, but no 
racial differences in homeownership rates among households with higher 
wealth.
94
 Wealth may be the great equalizer to differences in 
homeownership rates, but the quality of housing is another question and 
the topic of the next part. 
D. Homeownership Quality: The Ten Drop Rule
95
 
This part will show that not all homeownership is created equal. 
Racially based wealth disparities in America are widely known and have 
been the subject of intense scrutiny.
96
 Numerous proposals have been 
 
 
 92. Gale et al., supra note 13, at 1172 (―Studies suggest that, after controlling for a large number 
of observable characteristics, the unexplained black-white homeownership gap is smaller than just 
differences by income class would suggest . . . .‖). 
 93. Id. (―[the gap] still ranges between 5 and 10 percentage points . . . .‖) (citations omitted).  
 94. Charles & Hurst, supra note 14, at 282 (―Gyourko et al., (1999) . . . find no racial differences 
in home ownership rates among households with large enough wealth to meet down-payment and 
closing-cost requirements. However, they do find large ownership differences between black and 
white households with low wealth.‖).  
 95. Cf. Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 178 (1998) (―Whereas most states before the Civil War had defined 
‗negro‘ according to fractions of ‗blood‘—usually one-eighth or one-fourth—many moved to one-
drop-of-blood rules.‖).  
 96. See, e.g., MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
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made seeking to encourage blacks to buy homes as a way to decrease 
those wealth disparities. This Article argues that homeownership is 
increasing wealth disparities, in part due to federal tax policies.
97
 
Blacks are more likely to buy homes that do not appreciate as much as 
white homes.
98
 In addition, the resale value of white homes is greater than 
for black homes.
99
 The reasons for this phenomenon are complicated. 
Homes lose about 16% of their value when more than 10% of the 
neighborhood is black.
100
 Blacks are more likely to live in 
majority/minority neighborhoods, and whenever a neighborhood is more 
than 10% black, property values decline.
101
 The point at which the black 
percentage of residents becomes too high for white comfort is called the 
―tipping point.‖102  
Whites do not want to live in neighborhoods with blacks, unless the 
percentage of blacks is very low.
103
 Studies have not documented the same 
 
 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1996) (analyzing the wealth disparity between blacks and 
whites at all income levels); Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, from 1983 to 
1998, in ASSETS FOR THE POOR 34, 46 (Thomas M. Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001). 
 97. Cf. Maury Gittleman & Edward N. Wolff, Racial Differences in Patterns of Wealth 
Accumulation, 39 J. HUM. RES. 193, 200 (2004) (―Implicit in proposals to shift the portfolios of 
African Americans toward assets such as homes and businesses is that African Americans face barriers 
to the acquisition of these assets, owing to discrimination in mortgage and small business credit 
markets, customer discrimination, limited access to information about investment opportunities and 
other factors.‖) (citations omitted). 
 98. See Rusk, supra note 4, at 2 (―In effect, for a dollar of income, black homeowners were 
getting only 70 percent of the home value that white homeowners received.‖). 
 99. Keister, supra note 80, at 479 (―that resale values of homes are greater for whites than for 
blacks, and that whites typically receive more favorable terms in home mortgage lending than blacks 
. . . .‖) (citations omitted). 
 100. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Cf. Richard D. Alba, John R. Logan & Brian J. 
Stults, How Segregated are Middle-Class Americans?, 47 SOC. PROB. 543, 552 (2000) (―This picture 
is consistent with the conclusion of Massey and Denton (1993) that whites at all socioeconomic levels 
avoid residence in neighborhoods that have more than very small percentages (5–10 percent seems 
typical) of African Americans.‖).  
 101. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 102. David P. Kasakove, New York State Association of Realtors, Inc. v. Shaffer: When the 
Second Circuit Chooses Between Free Speech and Fair Housing, Who Wins?, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 397, 
422 (1995) (―‗Tipping‘ is the sociological term used to refer to the critical point at which whites, either 
a single family or collectively, leave a community, because of black entry into the neighborhood.‖). 
 103. See, e.g., Gregory D. Squires, Demobilization of the Individualistic Bias: Housing Market 
Discrimination as a Contributor to Labor Market and Economic Inequality, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 200, 206 (2007). As Professor Squires has written:  
African Americans have been particularly affected as several studies have found them to be 
the most disfavored minority group by whites as well as other racial and ethnic groups 
(Charles 2005). Evidence indicates that it is the presence of blacks, and not just neighborhood 
conditions often associated with black neighborhoods (e.g., bad schools, high crime) that 
accounts for white aversion to such areas. In one survey, whites reported that they would be 
unlikely to purchase a home that met their requirements in terms of price, number of rooms, 
and other housing characteristics in a neighborhood with good schools and low crime rates if 
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reaction by whites regarding Asians or Latinos.
104
 Most whites prefer to 
live in overwhelmingly white neighborhoods, with only token 
representation by minorities, while most blacks prefer to live in 50/50 
racially diverse neighborhoods.
105
 As Nathan Glazer has noted, ―the 
neighborhood that blacks would like, 50 percent black, is one that most 
whites would move away from, making it close to 100 percent black.‖106 
White preferences will only allow a limited percentage of blacks (no 
more than 10%) to be eligible for the greatest housing appreciation.
107
 
Similarly, black preferences will result in blacks living in neighborhoods 
with a greater than 10% minority population and result in their being 
ineligible for the greatest housing appreciation. Research indicates that 
blacks prefer to live in integrated neighborhoods and not predominantly 
white neighborhoods because of racial prejudice and fears of white 
hostility.
108
 
 
 
there was a substantial representation of African Americans. The presence of Hispanics or 
Asians had no such effect (Emerson, Chai, and Yancey 2001). 
Id.; see also R. Richard Banks, ―Nondiscriminatory‖ Perpetuation of Racial Subordination, 76 B.U. 
L. REV. 669, 686–87 (1996) (―The most charitable explanation for whites‘ intolerance of more than a 
few black neighbors is that whites believe that as more blacks move into an area, property values will 
decline. Thus, investment-sensitive whites look to a community‘s racial composition as a barometer of 
its financial prospects.‖) (citation omitted); Maria Krysan & Reynolds Farley, The Residential 
Preferences of Blacks: Do They Explain Persistent Segregation?, 80 SOC. FORCES 937 (2002) 
(demonstrating that blacks prefer to live in diverse, 50–50 communities, whereas whites prefer to live 
in homogenous white areas).  
 104. Squires, supra note 103, at 206 (―The presence of Hispanics or Asians had no such effect 
. . . .‖) (citation omitted). 
 105. See, e.g., John A. Powell, Government Tax and Housing Policies, in TAXING AMERICA 104 
(Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (―Although the preferred neighborhood 
composition of all whites is all, or predominantly, white, the expressed preference of most Blacks is 
for a neighborhood that is half-black, half-white.‖) (citations omitted). Cf. John O. Calmore, Race/ism 
Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1086 n.106 (1998) (―For 
many whites, this is another way of saying, ‗We‘re sick of the whole issue‘ (‗race fatigue‘ is the term 
some social scientists use to describe this spreading feeling).‖ (quoting Martin Duberman, Promised 
Land, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at 11 (book review))). 
 106. Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 298 (2002). 
 107. Cf. Alba et al., supra note 100, at 552 (―[White homeowners] usually live with very few 
black neighbors, in any event . . . whites at all socioeconomic levels avoid residence in neighborhoods 
that have more than very small percentages (5–10 percent seems typical) of African-Americans.‖). 
 108. Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Neighborhood Racial-Composition Preferences: Evidence from 
a Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 SOC. PROBS. 379, 380 (2000) (―Some research suggests that active racial 
prejudice plays a role in reproducing racial residential segregation.‖) (citations omitted); Maria Krysan 
& Reynolds Farley, The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do They Explain Persistent Segregation?, 
80 SOC. FORCES 937, 969–70 (2002). Authors Krysan and Farley draw the following four conclusions 
about why most blacks live in majority minority neighborhoods: 
First, the residential preferences of African Americans play a role in maintaining 
neighborhood segregation. . . . The preferred neighborhood for the typical black is one that is 
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There are primarily two explanations for why whites prefer not to live 
with blacks, and they may operate individually or in tandem.
109
 The first is 
white aversion to minorities generally and the second is white fear (which 
given the data provided herein is rational) that when minorities move into 
the neighborhood, their property values will decline.
110
 To compound the 
problem, realtors are reluctant to facilitate blacks buying homes in 
predominantly white neighborhoods where appreciation potential is great, 
for fear of the reaction of the existing white homeowners—their client 
base.
111
  
Numerous studies have documented the black disadvantage in housing 
quality,
112
 and housing values.
113
 Blacks are more likely to purchase 
 
 
about 50–50. Most American neighborhoods are overwhelmingly white, and so they are not 
considered attractive to many blacks.  
 Second . . . African Americans are highly reluctant to buy or rent in largely white 
neighborhoods neither because they feel a strong allegiance to black communities nor because 
they wish their children to attend schools in a black environment. Rather, they want to live 
with other African Americans because they fear that they if they are one among many whites, 
whites will be hostile, blame them for any troubles that arise, and treat them as unwelcome 
intruders. . . .  
 Third, . . . Blacks wish to reside in 50–50 neighborhoods, but that is far too high a density 
of African Americans for all but a handful of whites. Few blacks have the option to buy a 
home in a 50–50 place. . . .  
. . . . 
 Finally, our findings emphasize the crucial role that white preferences continue to play in 
maintaining segregation. Whites‘ willingness to enter neighborhoods is strongly linked to the 
density of blacks there. As the suburbanization of African Americans continues, it is 
inevitable that some, perhaps many, neighborhoods will be written off by white home seekers 
as ―too black.‖ 
Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 1981–82 (―A review of the literature on 
housing segregation reveals two main hypotheses as to why white homeowners in segregated 
neighborhoods are averse to minority entry. The first, and more straightforward one, is aversion to 
minorities per se. The second is fear of adverse economic effects associated with minority entry.‖) 
(citations omitted). 
 110. See id.  
 111. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1843, 1854 n.24 (1994) (―Real estate brokers accused of steering prospective black 
buyers away from white neighborhoods consistently cite fear of reprisal by white property owners as 
the reason for the practice.‖); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate 
Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J. 808, 824 (1976) (arguing that residents of white areas are likely to 
―prefer to list their homes with brokers who will steer black buyers away from the neighborhoods.‖).  
 112. Hayward Derrick Horton & Melvin E. Thomas, Race, Class, and Family Structure: 
Differences in Housing Values for Black and White Homeowners, 68 SOC. INQ. 114, 117 (1998) (citing 
Susan M. Bianchi, Reynolds Farley & Daphne Spain, Racial Inequalities in Housing: An Examination 
of Recent Trends, 19 DEMOGRAPHY 37–51 (1982)). 
 113. Id. at 118 (citing John F. Kain & John M. Quigley, Housing Markets and Racial 
Discrimination: A Microeconomic Analysis, NAT‘L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (1975); Marty R. Jackman 
& Robert W. Jackman, Racial Inequality in Home Ownership, 58 SOC. FORCES 1221 (1980); Robert 
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homes which are less valuable than their white counterparts.
114
 That blacks 
fare less favorably from homeownership than whites is well-known and 
largely uncontested.  
Typical studies show that value of black homes is smaller than the 
value of white homes.
115
 White homes appreciate more quickly than black 
homes.
116
 Black couples own less housing wealth due to low market 
values.
117
 Blacks are often steered to buy homes in areas with declining 
home equity.
118
 Professor Shapiro, a leading scholar on racial disparities in 
homeownership in America has said ―[o]n average, homes owned by 
whites appreciate in value approximately $28,000 more than those owned 
by blacks.‖119 On the other hand, real estate more quickly appreciates in 
overwhelmingly white neighborhoods than 20% black neighborhoods.
120
 
 
 
Lake, The New Suburbanites: Race and Housing in the Suburbs, Rutgers Univ. Ctr. for Urban Policy 
Research (1981); MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1996)). 
 114. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 103, at 686 (―It is well established that the slower appreciation 
rate of property in black areas disadvantages black homeowners.‖) (citations omitted); Francine D. 
Blau & John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset Composition, 105 Q. J. ECON. 
321, 333 (1990) (discussing study showing ―homes in black neighborhoods have much lower rates of 
appreciation than those in white neighborhoods.‖); see also supra notes 111–13, and infra notes 115–
16.  
 115. See Charles & Hurst, supra note 14, at 288 (―Not only are blacks less likely to own homes 
than are whites, but, when they do own, the value of their homes is smaller at the means, at the 
medians, and with and without controls.‖). 
 116. See Keister, supra note 80, at 479 (―Indeed, there is considerable evidence that white families 
are more likely to own homes than black families, that the values of the homes owned by whites 
appreciate more rapidly than those of blacks.‖). 
 117. See Mann, supra note 13, at 1365 n.108 (―One study found that black couples own a 
disproportionately lower share of aggregate housing wealth, both because they are less likely to be 
homeowners and because they are more likely to own homes with low market values. The researchers 
found that race alone explained differences in the value of homes.‖) (citing James E. Long & Steven 
B. Caudill, Racial Differences in Home Ownership and Housing Wealth, 1970–1986, 30 ECON. INQ. 
83, 95–97 (1992)).  
 118. See Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and 
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 901 (2006) (―Moreover, studies have shown that 
Black homeowners, more than any others, are steered toward real estate that actually loses equity 
value.‖) (citations omitted). 
 119. See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 68.  
 120. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 437, 446 (2006) (―Real estate has historically appreciated much more quickly in all-white 
neighborhoods than in neighborhoods that have a ten percent African American population, and 
noticeably more quickly in ten percent African American neighborhoods than in twenty percent 
African American neighborhoods.‖) (citation omitted). Further, Professor Strahilevitz states: ―Thus, 
relatively minor changes in the racial composition of a neighborhood can have enormous 
consequences for a home owning family‘s net worth, and may cause families to change residences 
more frequently than they would prefer.‖ Id.  
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Blacks remain the most segregated group in America.
121
 This has 
translated into different housing conditions for black homeowners when 
compared with white homeowners of comparable income levels.
122
 Blacks 
who own homes are more likely to live in communities with fewer whites, 
while white homeowners are more likely to live with more whites once 
they become homeowners.
123
 White homeowners live with ―very few 
black neighbors.‖124 
Blacks of higher socioeconomic levels have not gained parity with their 
higher socioeconomic white counterparts.
125
 The inequality in housing 
values between middle-class blacks and middle-class whites is greater than 
the housing inequality between their lower-status counterparts.
126
 One 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is that blacks with high levels of 
income and education are unable to convert these attributes into a home in 
a desirable neighborhood with high appreciation potential because of 
discrimination they face in the housing market.
127
 
Nevertheless, the benefits of homeownership to middle-class blacks are 
significant when compared to black renters. The data show that blacks are 
not buying homes because homes are a good financial investment, but 
rather because homes afford blacks certain amenities.  
Middle-class black homeowners are able to send their children to better 
schools and are subject to lower crime rates.
128
 Even so, middle-class 
 
 
 121. Horton & Thomas, supra note 112, at 118 (citing Douglas S. Massey, Gretchen A. Condran 
& Nancy A. Denton, The Effect of Residential Segregation on Black Social and Economic Well-Being, 
66 SOC. FORCES 29 (1987); Nancy A. Denton & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation of Blacks, 
Hispanics, and Asians by Socioeconomic Status and Generation, 69 SOC. SCI. Q. 797 (1988); Douglas 
S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in the U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic 
Segregation along Five Dimensions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373 (1989); Richard Alba & John Logan, 
Variations on Two themes: Racial and Ethnic Patterns in the Attainment of suburban Residence, 28 
DEMOGRPAHY 431 (1991)). 
 122. Id. at 132 (―Black homeowners had housing values that were significantly lower than those 
of their White counterparts. This was the case despite control for age, social class, central city 
residence, household structure, and region.‖). 
 123. Alba et al., supra note 100, at 550. 
 124. Id. at 552. 
 125. Horton & Thomas, supra note 112, at 126. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 133. 
 128. Alba et al., supra note 100, at 556. Consider the following: 
 Middle-class African-Americans do, indeed, experience improvements in their residential 
location by comparison with their poorer co-ethnics. . . . [T]he affluence of their 
neighborhoods, which is undoubtedly correlated with many other neighborhood 
characteristics from the quality of schools or housing to the risks of criminal victimization, 
goes up sharply in association with higher household income, personal educational 
attainment, home ownership, and suburban location. 
Id. 
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blacks tend to live with white neighbors who are less affluent than they are 
(recall the Chris Rock story at the introduction).
129
 Put another way, 
middle-class blacks live in neighborhoods that are not equal in affluence 
with their middle-class white counterparts.
130
 Similarly situated white 
homeowners live in more affluent communities and suffer less crime than 
their black counterparts and even though middle-class black homeowners 
may fare better than black renters, they do not fare as well as middle-class 
white homeowners.
131
 Whites and blacks experience homeownership very 
differently. While neighborhoods of black homeowners generally are 
better off than neighborhoods of black renters, neighborhoods of white 
homeowners are significantly better off than neighborhoods of white 
renters.
132
  
To summarize, the upside potential for housing appreciation exists to a 
far greater extent for middle- and upper-income white homeowners than 
the majority of black homeowners who live in majority/minority 
neighborhoods.
 
This is due to several factors. First, the value of homes 
decrease any time there is more than 10% of black homeowners in a 
particular neighborhood. Second, whites prefer to live in overwhelmingly 
white neighborhoods. Third, blacks prefer to live in racially diverse 
neighborhoods.  
E. Tax Benefits and Race 
Federal tax subsidies for housing leave the majority of blacks and 
Latinos out because they rent and do not own their homes. Because rent 
payments are not deductible, those most likely to pay rent will not benefit. 
The majority of blacks and Latinos are renters, and therefore, are the most 
likely to be harmed by the disallowance of rent payment deductions. 
Whites and Asians are most likely to be homeowners and not renters, and 
therefore do not pay the same ―penalty.‖  
Previous scholars have argued that blacks and Latinos benefit 
significantly from the tax subsidies for housing (even though whites 
 
 
 129. Id. at 544 (―However, [middle-class blacks‘] white neighbors tend to have lower incomes 
than they do; consequently, middle-class blacks live in less affluent communities than do whites with 
the same socioeconomic characteristics.‖). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 556 (―[A]t no point do blacks attain residential parity with whites—that is, the 
communities in which they reside have less affluence and other less desirable characteristics (e.g., 
more crime) than the communities where whites with similar personal and household characteristics 
are found.‖). 
 132. Shlay, supra note 42, at 520. 
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benefit more).
133
 What is important to a determination of whether black 
and Latino homeowners benefit from the housing tax subsidies is whether 
they are more likely to itemize and/or exclude gain. If they are not, then 
even though a significant percent are homeowners, they will not benefit 
from the tax subsidies for housing. 
Given that only taxpayers who itemize deductions receive the benefit 
of the deductions, and since there is a greater percentage of white middle- 
and upper-income homeowners than black or Latino middle- and upper-
income homeowners, I would predict that white homeowners are more 
likely to benefit from the itemized deduction associated with the mortgage 
interest deduction than blacks or Latinos. 
Interestingly, a few geographically targeted studies have shown that 
homes in majority/minority neighborhoods are assessed at higher effective 
rates for property tax purposes than similar property in majority/white 
neighborhoods.
134
 If those findings were replicated on a nationwide scale, 
then once again we would see blacks and Latinos paying more for their 
housing costs than whites. 
Housing appreciation upon sale is excludable up to $500,000 and 
amounts in excess are taxed at the lower capital gains rate. Because black 
homes are less likely to appreciate as much as white homes, black 
homeowners are far less likely to receive the full benefit of this exclusion. 
White homeowners are more likely to pay the preferential capital gains 
rate because their gain may exceed the exclusion amount. In fact, even if 
blacks wanted to live in white neighborhoods, only a token percentage 
would be ―permitted‖ to do so without risking the potential for housing 
appreciation for everyone.  
Therefore, the majority of blacks will never be able to purchase homes 
with the most upside appreciation potential—because those houses are in 
overwhelmingly white neighborhoods that must remain overwhelmingly 
 
 
 133. See, e.g., Mann supra note 13, at 1365 (―Blacks and Hispanics derive less benefit from the 
home mortgage interest deduction because they tend to have lower incomes than whites.‖) (citation 
omitted); Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 780 (―Unlike the tax benefits that apply primarily to 
other forms of wealth, from which few blacks gain, many blacks benefit from the tax benefits of 
homeownership. But while blacks benefit, whites benefit even more.‖).  
 134. See Lee Harris, ‗Assessing‘ Discrimination: The Influence of Race in Residential Property 
Tax Assessments, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2004) (describing author‘s study of homes in New 
Haven, Connecticut). Cf. Richard Delgado, Home-Grown Racism: Colorado‘s Historic Embrace—and 
Denial—of Equal Opportunity in Higher Education, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 703, 720–22 (1999) 
(describing events from the early twentieth century in Colorado). ―Mexican Americans lost eighty 
percent of their original land grants, some to conniving lawyers and land developers, others because of 
high property taxes imposed on Mexican-American owners—in some cases five times higher than 
those paid by their Anglo neighbors.‖ Id. at 721 (citations omitted).  
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white. Put another way, there is a cap on the percent of black homeowners 
who can live in substantially white neighborhoods and benefit the most 
from housing (Not everyone can be Chris Rock—in fact according to him, 
only three others are like him in his neighborhood). The argument can be 
made that having gain that is excluded is better than having so much gain 
that it is taxed, but that argument is unpersuasive. With the reduced capital 
gains rate applicable to any such gain, it is a small price for whites to pay 
for significant appreciation.  
While all homeowners benefit from the exclusion for imputed rent, 
regardless of race, those in the most desirable neighborhoods benefit the 
most. These homeowners are most likely to be middle- and upper-income 
white homeowners. Those who benefit the least (or would have less 
income excluded) are those in the least-desirable neighborhoods. These 
homeowners (most likely black and Latino) are likely to be living in any 
neighborhood with more than 10% black neighbors—mainly black 
homeowners. 
F. Blogosphere Attention 
In the course of presenting earlier drafts at numerous venues, there 
have been blog postings about this Article. This part will describe the 
posts and my reactions in turn.  
The first blog post was a result of my serving as a panelist at the 
Section on Taxation‘s program at the Association of American Law 
Schools‘ annual convention in San Diego on Thursday, January 8, 2009.135 
The blog entry was written by Professor Neal Buchanan and entitled 
―Helping the Non-Rich, by Accident.‖136 Professor Buchanan observes 
that homeownership is a very bad way to save money. He, of course, 
ignores how the white middle class was created post-World War II in part 
due to homeownership. He also ignores the very real advantages of 
homeownership, which flow from having home equity.  
Home equity can be used to send your children to college or provide 
them with a down payment for their own home, or, at death, it can provide 
them with a home outright, perhaps mortgage-free. Professor Buchanan 
 
 
 135. See Audio recording: The Family and Taxation, American Association of Law Schools, 
AALS 2009 Annual Meeting (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.aals.org/events_am2009.php (follow 
―-Podcasts-‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Sessions‖ hyperlink; then follow ―Taxation‖ hyperlink). The 
panelists were, in addition to myself: Anthony Infanti; Lily Kahng; Marjorie Kornhauser (moderator) 
and Dennis Ventry. 
 136. See Posting of Neal H. Buchanan to Dorf on Law, http://michaeldorf.org/2009/01/helping-
non-rich-by-accident.html (Jan. 15, 2009, 12:01 EST).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2009] SHADES OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 363 
 
 
 
 
also ignores the forced savings function of having a mortgage. Each of 
these benefits is available to whites in a way currently unavailable to 
blacks, and tax laws make things worse not better. Yet, Professor 
Buchanan‘s paternalistic argument is that the extent to which low-income 
homeowners are disadvantaged under the current law is acceptable 
because ―a tax system that leaves out the low-income taxpayers is actually 
doing them a favor by not encouraging them to own a home.‖137  
The fallacy of Buchanan‘s argument is that since Congress says that 
tax subsidies are designed to encourage homeownership, then we cannot 
exclude low-income taxpayers who are striving for a better life for their 
families, nor can we exclude blacks who have been excluded from 
homeownership by the government for far too long. The government 
should provide help for all and be a hindrance for none. 
The second post was a result of my participation in New York 
University School of Law‘s Spring 2009 Tax Policy Colloquium co-
organized by Professors Daniel Shaviro and Alan Auerbach on February 
12, 2009. The post occurred the next day.
138
 Professor Shaviro argues that 
whites do not benefit from homeownership because tax subsidies are built 
into the price of their homes, which are then deducted.
139
 In effect, all 
homeowners, regardless of race, get what they pay for. They have received 
no benefit. This argument, however, misses the mark on several fronts. 
First, Professors Shaviro and Auerbach missed a key point I tried to 
make in the draft; namely, the racial disparity in housing appreciation 
received by black and white homeowners. Their primary critique was 
based on the assumption that all tax subsidies are built into the purchase 
price. Professor Shaviro then states that whites are only getting what they 
pay for after tax and are not receiving a benefit.
140
 Professor Auerbach 
similarly assumes that in this instance housing depreciation is built into the 
price. He also states that blacks are getting a greater exclusion for imputed 
rental income as a percent of purchase price when compared with their 
white counterparts who actually paid more money for their homes. I will 
respond to each in turn. 
I have never seen any study suggesting that future housing appreciation 
(or depreciation) from a future sale is built into the purchase price the way 
the tax deductions for the mortgage interest are, nor have Professors 
 
 
 137. Id.  
 138. See Posting of Dan Shaviro to Start Making Sense, http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2009/02/ 
tax-policy-colloquium-on-dorothy-browns.html (Feb. 13, 2009, 8:28 EST).  
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
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Shaviro or Auerbach cited to any such study. Given market fluctuations, I 
would be curious as to how this would even be possible. There is no 
serious basis for assuming that housing appreciation (or depreciation) is 
built into the purchase price and, as a result, whites who get more 
appreciation have in fact received something they did not pay for. In 
reality, they receive untaxed wealth that their black counterparts do not 
have access to simply because their neighbors are white. Given the 
uncontroverted evidence that housing appreciation in predominantly black 
neighborhoods is significantly less than housing appreciation in 
overwhelmingly white neighborhoods, whites benefit from 
homeownership appreciation in ways that blacks do not. 
Professor Auerbach suggests that the lack of housing appreciation may 
lower the purchase price, which would enable the homeowner to receive a 
higher exclusion for the imputed rental value than if the higher 
appreciation were built into the price. Again, Professor Auerbach is 
making the argument that the market prices homes with the appreciation—
or depreciation—built into the price without a single citation in support of 
his assertion. What is all the more bothersome about this line of argument 
is the notion that it is somehow a good thing that the price of a home in a 
predominantly black neighborhood is lower relative to their white 
counterparts. The price is lower, but the value of the exclusion for imputed 
rental income is a greater percentage of the purchase price when compared 
with the value of the same exclusion for a white homeowner in a higher-
valued home. Therefore, blacks benefit more than whites from the 
exclusion. If Professor Auerbach is right, then we should see a rush to the 
market to buy older homes in predominantly black neighborhoods. I 
should want to buy the worst house on the worst block, in a predominantly 
black neighborhood so my purchase price would be really low, because 
then the exclusion for the rental value would be a huge percentage of the 
purchase price. Yet, the reality is, all other things being equal, we do not 
want to buy that house. We want the homes with the most appreciation 
possible, because up to $500,000 of the appreciation is excluded. Although 
the imputed rental income may be a higher percentage of the purchase 
price for the typical black homeowner, the Internal Revenue Code does not 
exclude imputed rental income based on its percentage of the purchase 
price, but value of the home. Thus, Professor Auerbach‘s argument is 
unpersuasive. Whites‘ homes are more valuable and the exclusion is worth 
more to those homeowners because the imputed rental income is higher. 
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I never cease to be amazed at the mental gymnastics tax law scholars 
go through in their quest to show that the tax laws do not benefit whites 
when they obviously do.
141
 For instance, Professor Zelenak argues that 
blacks benefit from tax law because welfare benefits are excluded from 
taxation.
142
 (To the extent that there are more whites than blacks on 
welfare, whites will benefit more from the exclusion.) Professor Zelenak 
and others argue that the progressive tax rate structure is anti-white (or 
pro-black).
143
 Something happens to reasonably intelligent tax academics 
when race is thrown into the mix.  
Professor Livingston describes tax professors as conservative.
144
 Who 
can seriously argue that because welfare is not taxed, the poor receive a 
tax benefit and are the beneficiaries of a progressive tax rate? Would you 
rather be poor and pay very little in taxes or be rich and pay very little in 
taxes? In other words, would you rather be Warren Buffett (even when he 
is having his worst year ever
145
) or poor? In 2006, Warren Buffet noted 
that his tax rate was 17.7% on $46 million of income. He did not pay tax 
at the maximum 35% on the majority of his income. He is the typical, rich 
beneficiary of our progressive tax rate structure. So, if I have the choice 
between being poor and paying less in taxes or being Warren Buffet and 
paying less in taxes, I would want to be Warren Buffet.  
 
 
 141. See Brown, Tax Treatment, supra note 48, at 808–17 (describing race and gender 
composition of tax law professors at American law schools and their difficulty dealing with race 
questions). The disparity in treatment between wages and payments to hedge fund managers could 
change as the Obama administration‘s recent budget included a plan to tax hedge fund managers at the 
maximum progressive tax rate. 
 142. Id. at 804 (―Professor Zelenak continues by speculating about ‗other likely candidates‘ in the 
tax code that are pro-Black. They include the exclusion from income of welfare-type benefits.‖) 
(citation omitted).  
 143. Id. (Zelenak writes about ―tax code provisions that are anti-White . . . includ[ing] . . . 
‗progressive marginal rates‘ . . . . Professor Bryce states ‗[t]he Code discriminates against whites. The 
progressive rate structure results in whites paying most of the federal income tax.‖). I was once told, in 
an audience of my peers, at the Annual Meeting of the Association of Law Schools that my work was 
irrelevant because everyone knows that blacks benefit from the progressive tax rate structure because 
they are poor and do not pay a lot of taxes. 
 144. See Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholarship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role 
of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 393 (1998) (―[T]ax professors have always been a 
conservative lot.‖). 
 145. David Segal, In Letter, Buffett Accepts Blame and Faults Others, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, 
at A16 (―The renowned investor Warren E. Buffett chided himself and the business world at large in 
his annual letter to shareholders of his holding company on Saturday as he sifted through the wreckage 
of his worst year in four decades.‖).  
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G. Summary 
Federal tax laws that encourage homeownership benefit whites. The 
overwhelming majority of whites at virtually every income level (with the 
exception of $5,000–9,999) are homeowners. Most blacks and Latinos are 
renters and thus ineligible for any tax subsidies for their housing expenses. 
Most whites and Asians are homeowners and therefore eligible to receive 
tax subsidies. The tax subsidies tend to benefit more expensive homes and 
taxpayers subject to the highest marginal tax rates. Those homeowners are 
largely middle- and upper-income white homeowners.  
Finally, the exclusion from income of imputed rental value benefits 
those who live in the most expensive homes—largely middle- and upper-
income white homeowners. In addition, since whites are more likely to 
have the greatest housing appreciation, they are more likely than blacks to 
benefit from the exclusion from income on gain from the sale of their 
home.  
V. RACE- AND CLASS-BASED SOLUTIONS: ENCOURAGING 
HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR ALL 
A. Introduction  
At present, federal tax policies reinforce the race- and class-based 
discrimination faced by homeowners. This part proposes changes to 
federal tax policy, which, if adopted, would disrupt this race- and class-
based discrimination.  
Previous scholars have addressed the race and/or class aspects of 
mortgage interest deductions—some more successfully than others. 
However, no proposal addresses both the race and class dimensions of the 
problem. One proposal would convert real property and mortgage interest 
deductions into a credit which would begin to be phased out when income 
on a joint return reaches $50,000.
146
 That amount was chosen because 
―most black families earn less than $50,000.‖147 
That the credit proposal was nonrefundable means it will not be 
available to blacks with no income tax liability, but will be available to 
 
 
 146. Moran & Whitford, supra note 23, at 781. The authors, however, retain the exclusion from 
gain. This seems consistent: they would have a limitation on gain that is excluded the same way they 
propose to phase out the mortgage interest and real property deductions once joint income reaches 
$50,000. 
 147. Id. at 781 n.110 (―Only six percent of black families have incomes greater than $50,000.‖) 
(citation omitted).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2009] SHADES OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 367 
 
 
 
 
those who are subject to significant social security withholding. Even if 
there is a minority of blacks earning more than $50,000, according to table 
4.2 supra, only at income levels above $60,000 do significant percentages 
of blacks (70%) become homeowners. So while the $50,000 income level 
may tell us something about most blacks, it does not tell us much about 
most black homeowners. To take away the mortgage interest deduction 
would be to take away tax benefits from a significant percentage of black 
homeowners.
148
 
Another proposal would create a credit called the shelter credit.
149
 It 
leaves open the possibility that the credit would be refundable.
150
 The 
shelter credit would have two parts. The first part would ―encourage the 
purchase of a median-priced home.‖151 The second part would increase the 
amount of the credit for homes located close to public transportation as a 
way of reducing sprawl.
152
 That the proposal leaves open the possibility of 
a refundable credit would benefit low-income homeowners; however, the 
proposal did not address racial disparities in the homeownership market. 
While the proposals are novel in that they attempted to address race or 
class disparities in the tax laws, which support homeownership, I do not 
believe either was truly comprehensive. Class reform can only be 
addressed with a refundable credit. Nonrefundable credits will not be 
available to low-income taxpayers whose income tax liability is 
completely offset by the earned income tax credit (EITC). Also, limiting 
the deduction for blacks who make more than $50,000 seems unhelpful 
given the data presented in table 4.2 showing the high percentages of 
blacks and Latinos who are homeowners once household income reaches 
$50,000.  
 
 
 148. Cf. Wilton Hyman, Race, Class, and the Internal Revenue Code: A Class Based Analysis of 
A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 119, 150 (2006). Professor Hyman 
wrote: 
Professors Moran and Whitford‘s recommendation to eliminate the home mortgage interest 
and property tax deductions and replace them with a tax credit would harm the interests of 
middle-income taxpayers . . . . [F]or blacks and whites with household income greater than 
$50,000, their home ownership rates were seventy-five percent and eighty-five percent, 
respectively, reflecting the relationship between rising incomes and home ownership rates. 
Eliminating the home ownership tax provisions would harm the interests of those blacks most 
able to utilize them and would impair the ability of many blacks to acquire their most 
significant asset.  
Id. (citations omitted). 
 149. Mann, supra note 13, at 1394–96. 
 150. Another proposal by Professor Peter Dreier would call for converting the mortgage interest 
deduction into a refundable homeowner tax credit. Mann, supra note 13, at 1394.  
 151. Id. at 1394. 
 152. Id. at 1395. 
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B. Solutions to End Race and Class Discrimination 
This part provides three different proposals (however, the refundable 
credit solution is similar to that discussed above), which are designed to 
decrease the race and class discrimination experienced by homeowners 
under current tax law. The first two proposals address the class-based 
discrimination and the third proposal addresses the race-based 
discrimination currently operating in the housing market.  
The first proposal would change existing deductions into refundable 
credits. Then-Senator Obama‘s Tax Plan provided for a refundable credit 
in place of the mortgage interest deduction, which is designed to benefit 
low- and middle-income homeowners who cannot currently itemize their 
deductions.
153
 
The second proposal would allow losses on the sale of homes for low-
income taxpayers to be deductible. The third would only allow future 
deductions for homeownership to be received by homeowners in ―racially 
diverse‖ neighborhoods. This part concludes by arguing that federal tax 
policy—which is currently discriminating against low-income 
homeowners and middle- and upper-income black homeowners—must be 
changed. 
1. Convert the Deduction into a Refundable Credit 
The President‘s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform suggested that 
the mortgage interest deduction be changed to a credit, which would make 
it available to taxpayers who do not itemize.
154
 However, the fact that the 
credit would not be refundable would mean that it would not be available 
to very low-income homeowners who otherwise have no income tax 
liability. In addition, the proposal does nothing to address the racial 
disparities faced by taxpayers in the homeownership market.  
Converting the deduction into a refundable credit responds to the class-
based discrimination faced in the market. In that way, low-income 
taxpayers who did not itemize, but had an income tax liability, would 
benefit from the credit. Further, low-income taxpayers who did not have 
income tax liability (but paid social security taxes) would receive a refund 
 
 
 153. BOB WILLIAMS, LEN E. BURMAN, SURACHAI KHITATRAKUN, JEFF ROHALY, GREG 
LEISERSON & ERIC TODER, TAX POL‘Y CTR., AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATES‘ TAX PLANS: REVISED AUGUST 15, 2008, UPDATED SEPTEMBER 12, 2008 (2008), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/url.cfm?ID=411749. 
 154. PRESIDENT‘S REPORT, supra note 53, at 73–75. 
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from the government, allowing them the full benefits that their middle- 
and upper-income counterparts already enjoy.
155
  
As I have written elsewhere, making a credit refundable is politically 
perilous.
156
 The earned income tax credit, a refundable credit that has been 
analogized to ―welfare,‖ and the attendant racial politics that accompany 
that debate could become a part of this discussion.
157
 To increase the 
likelihood of success, what would have to be emphasized is that the 
overwhelming majority of homeowners are white and benefits for 
homeowners are likely to be received by whites. The difficulty then arises, 
 
 
 155. Cf. Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter Orszag, Efficiency and Tax Incentives: 
The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 28–29 (2006) (―Under current law, more 
than 35% of tax units during any given year have no income tax liability, and these tax units are home 
to almost half of all American children. Deductions, exclusions, and non-refundable credits are 
typically worthless to them.‖) (citations omitted). 
 156. Brown, Race and Class Matters, supra note 48, at 816–19 (describing how earned income 
tax credit (EITC) recipients are viewed as receiving ―welfare‖ because of the refundable nature of the 
EITC). But see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Welfare By Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 
AM. U.L. REV. 1261, 1274 (2007) (author argues that ―[t]hese attacks on low-income taxpayers and 
their tax-transfer benefits are serious. But doomsayers overstate the threat. The EITC is neither in 
danger of being ‗repealed outright‘ nor ‗headed for extinction.‘ This is not 1994 when the Republican 
Contract with America explicitly associated the EITC with the old welfare regime.‖) (citations 
omitted). What Professor Ventry ignores, however, is the cyclical nature of the racial politics 
surrounding welfare discourse in America. For example, in the 2008 presidential campaign there were 
numerous examples where refundable credits proposed by Senator Obama were referred to as welfare. 
See, e.g., E.J. Dionne Jr., Bottom-Up? The Campaigns Finally Begin A Serious Debate On The 
Economy, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 31, 2008, at B7 (―Mr. McCain has argued that Mr. 
Obama‘s refundable tax credits amount to ‗welfare.‘ That, too, is a strange claim, since Mr. McCain 
favors refundable credits as part of his health plan. But the whole idea is to persuade voters such as 
Emily Daywalt that Mr. Obama really is just out to help those ‗who don‘t do anything.‘‖); Steven 
Greenhouse, For Incomes Below $100,000, a Better Tax Break in Obama‘s Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 31, 
2008, at A14 (―Helped by the emergence of Joe the Plumber and using Mr. Obama‘s own words, Mr. 
McCain has insisted that Mr. Obama‘s tax policies would hurt small businesses and upwardly mobile 
individuals, while providing welfare for low-income Americans.‖); Janet Hook, A liberal use of the 
word?; McCain‘s Efforts to portray Obama as far left obscure subtleties in the Democrat‘s policies, 
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at A1 (―About 40% of workers do not make enough to pay income taxes. 
Obama argues that they deserve relief because they pay other levies, such as payroll taxes, which fund 
Social Security and Medicare. McCain says the cash payments to these earners would be tantamount to 
welfare. A recent campaign Internet ad charges: ‗Obama raises taxes on seniors, on hard-working 
families, to give ‗welfare‘ to those who pay none.‘‖); Jeanne Kilgore, Most people don‘t know what 
‗socialism‘ is, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 3, 2008, at 6B (―It is Obama who says he wants to 
give 95 percent of the taxpayers a tax cut. But if 40 percent don‘t pay taxes, how can they get money? 
By increasing the rate on top earners and sending that money to those that pay nothing is his plan. Not 
a one-time stimulus bonus, but an every year payment. That is welfare, that is adjusting the wealth, 
that is socialism.‖); Debra J. Saunders, Questions About Obama, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 30, 2008, at B7 
(―The Tax Policy Center also estimates that, under Plan Obama, 49 percent of Americans will not pay 
federal income taxes. So when Obama talks up his plan to send a $500 to $1,000 ―rebate‖ to American 
taxpayers, he is talking welfare.‖). The racial politics surrounding the word ―welfare‖ ebbs and flows 
over time and it is overly optimistic for anyone to declare victory. 
 157. Brown, Race and Class Matters, supra note 48, at 816–19. 
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because the poor are typically perceived as black.
158
 The interesting 
question would be whether the typical poor homeowner would be 
automatically presumed to be black or white. If the perception would be 
that the typical homeowner is white, the politics could work out favorably 
for the proposal.
159
  
This proposal is especially important to the extent that low-income 
taxpayers are purchasing homes and not benefiting from the mortgage 
interest deduction, even though the tax benefit is included in the price of 
the homes they are purchasing. Put another way, the call to convert 
deductions into refundable credits is especially strong here—where assets 
are priced assuming a tax deduction, which is not available to a significant 
percentage of low-income homeowners. 
2. Allow Losses to be Deductible 
Low-income homeowners are most likely to sell their homes at a loss 
and return to renting without receiving any wealth accumulation. This 
proposal would allow losses to be deducted on the sale of personal 
residences by low-income homeowners. Generally, the loss on a sale of a 
personal residence would be characterized as a capital loss but not 
recognized. If recognized, capital loss deductions are only allowed to the 
extent of capital gains and, after all the gains are exhausted, are only 
allowed to the extent of $3,000 of ordinary income.
160
 Assuming that low-
income households are less likely to have capital gains, allowing the loss 
only to offset gains will not help these taxpayers very much. Therefore, I 
would allow the loss to offset ordinary income to a greater extent than just 
$3,000, as provided by current law.
161
 During the 2008 presidential 
campaign, Senator McCain suggested increasing the amount of loss on the 
 
 
 158. Id. at 813 (―American opposition to welfare is due to the public perception that the typical 
welfare recipient is undeserving. They are undeserving because Americans believe that most welfare 
recipients are black . . . .‖).  
 159. Id. at 819–30 (describing how once the public realized that majority of EITC claimants are 
white, support for the EITC would increase). 
 160. See I.R.C. §§ 1211 and 1212 (2007).  
 161. Professor Richard Epstein suggested years ago that the proper way to account for losses on 
the sale of a personal residence would be to reduce the basis by the amount of allowable depreciation 
(if depreciation were permitted on personal residences) and calculate the difference between that basis 
and the amount realized to determine if there was a loss on sale and to recognize that loss. Richard 
Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal Property Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. 
L. REV. 454, 457–62 (1971). Professor Epstein did not limit his suggestion to low-income 
homeowners, however. I would like to thank Professor Dan Shaviro for referring me to this article. 
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sale of stock that could be used to offset ordinary income to $15,000.
162
 
That may be a place to start in thinking through this proposal.  
3. Allow Credit for Racially Diverse Neighborhoods 
This solution would address the market premium placed on 
homogeneous white neighborhoods and the market penalty placed on 
neighborhoods with more than 10% black homeowners. This is not a 
solution designed to encourage integration but one designed to address the 
market penalty paid by all homeowners in neighborhoods with more than 
10% black neighbors. This solution would not be required if the market 
placed a premium on segregation where black majority neighborhoods 
were worth what white majority neighborhoods are worth—a form of 
―separate but equal‖ housing price discrimination.  
But how the housing market operates is that black majority 
neighborhoods are penalized simply because ―too many‖ blacks live there. 
This proposal seeks to compensate homeowners regardless of race in 
majority/minority neighborhoods for the market rate penalty they face. 
This proposal is not intended to encourage anyone to move. It is solely 
designed to compensate homeowners currently subject to the ―cap‖ on 
appreciation and not to encourage integration. 
The credit would apply to both mortgage interest deductions and real 
property tax deductions. The refundable credit would only be available to 
homeowners who purchased homes after the proposal was enacted, in 
neighborhoods with more than 10% black homeowners.
163
 Any 
homeowner, regardless of race, would be eligible for the credit. The 
market discrimination—which currently penalizes homeowners where 
their neighbors are more than 10% black—would be minimized, if not 
eliminated. Therefore, homes in neighborhoods with more than 10% black 
neighbors should be priced at a premium if this proposal were adopted. 
This proposal would also encourage whites who were not interested in 
 
 
 162. See, e.g., Jane Sasseen, Moira Herbst, Phil Mintz, Catherine Arnst & Theo Francis, Election 
2008: McCain on the Economic Issues; Republican Presidential nominee Senator John McCain on 
taxes, jobs, education, health care, the financial crisis, and retirement, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Oct. 28, 
2008 (―[McCain] proposed raising the amount investors can deduct from $3,000 of capital losses to 
$15,000 for 2008 and 2009.‖). 
 163. Cf. John Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal For 
The Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (1993) (―As a disincentive, this legislation 
would modify the federal tax code so that property holders in municipalities that choose to ignore their 
prescribed housing goals would progressively lose their mortgage interest and property tax 
deductions.‖). I thank Dean Boger for referring me to his prior article. 
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living in homogeneous communities to move to racially diverse areas who 
do not do so for fear of a drop in their home property values. 
In addition, the tax provision would sunset in twenty-five years with a 
statutory requirement to study the marketplace impact of the credit every 
five years. A sunset of twenty-five years was selected because Justice 
O‘Connor, in upholding the University of Michigan Law School‘s use of 
race as a factor in admissions decisions, wrote, ―We expect that 25 years 
from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to 
further the interest approved today.‖164 Many commentators have 
suggested that Justice O‘Connor was stating that the constitutionality of 
race-based remedies turns upon whether they are time limited.
165
 
The question must be addressed whether such a proposal would pass 
constitutional muster especially in light of recent Supreme Court 
precedent.
166
 A full-blown constitutional analysis is not only beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is beyond the scope of my expertise. My initial 
thoughts, however, follow.  
This proposal seeks to remedy the raced-based market penalty for 
majority black neighborhoods that do not exist in majority white 
neighborhoods. As Justice Kennedy acknowledged in Parents Involved, 
―neighborhoods in our communities do not reflect the diversity of our 
Nation as a whole.‖167  
The strongest argument in favor of the proposal‘s constitutionality is 
that it is a remedy to the federal government‘s past history of intentional 
race-based discrimination in the housing market. Current market 
conditions are a direct result of government discrimination. During the 
1940s and 1950s, the Federal Housing Administration issued mortgage 
insurance on about a third of new homes and the rate of home ownership 
increased from 44% in 1940 to 62% in 1960.
168
 Until 1950, however, both 
the FHA and the Veterans Administration required that neighborhoods be 
racially segregated in order to receive mortgage insurance.
169
 The FHA‘s 
 
 
 164. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
 165. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of 
Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1974–75 (2006) (―The Court also split the 
difference temporally, indicating that in twenty-five years, race-conscious admissions policies may no 
longer be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.‖) (citation omitted). 
 166. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007). 
 167. Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring). I thank Professor Sam Bagenstos for suggesting that I 
look to Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence for support for my proposal. 
 168. See ANDREW WIESE, PLACES OF THEIR OWN: AFRICAN AMERICAN SUBURBANIZATION IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 100–01 (2004). 
 169. Id. at 101 (―As late as 1950, however, both agencies required that neighborhoods be racially 
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Underwriting Manual included samples of racially restrictive covenants.
170
 
Only 2% of the homes built with FHA support since World War II were 
occupied by minorities, by the late 1950s.
171
 
Racially restrictive covenants were legal until 1948.
172
 The FHA and 
Veteran‘s Administration policies excluded blacks from benefiting from 
homeownership for decades.
173
 The FHA did not offer full-throated 
support for integrated housing until after the passage of the Fair Housing 
Act in 1968.
174
 Although the government may have stopped actively 
discriminating on the basis of race, they did nothing to compensate blacks 
and other minority group members for the consequences of decades of 
intentional governmental race-based discrimination. Government action 
not only denied prospective homeowners of color the ability to buy a 
home because of their race, it resulted in housing wealth not being 
accumulated by those families, and that wealth disparity continues until 
this very day. 
While a full-blown constitutional analysis is outside the scope of this 
Article (even were we to find it constitutional), there are still several 
questions that remain. Is it politically viable? What is a neighborhood? 
How do we treat cities or states with overwhelmingly white populations? 
What does a racially diverse neighborhood look like? Should it be any 
neighborhood where more than 10% of blacks own homes—including a 
100% minority neighborhood? 
Turning to the proposal‘s impact, one could predict that homes in 
―racially diverse‖ neighborhoods would increase in value and homes in 
non-racially diverse neighborhoods would decrease in value.
175
 Even 
 
 
segregated in order for homes to qualify.‖). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).  
 173. See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the 
Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 593 (2002). As Professor Greenberg has written: 
 The ‗greatest mass-based opportunity for wealth accumulation in American history,‘ 
investing in a home during the 1950s and later, was also off limits to blacks. The Federal 
Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veteran‘s Administration (VA), which administered 
the mortgage insurance programs that made possible buying a home at reasonable mortgage 
rates, explicitly refused to insure mortgages for blacks in white neighborhoods. Huge housing 
developments, like Levittown, would not sell to blacks. Nothing comparable was built by or 
for blacks. They were tightly concentrated in the ghetto where property values not only did 
not soar, but suffered in value because of the ambient social pathology. In contrast, the value 
of homes purchased under FHA-insured and VA-insured mortgage arrangements has 
increased spectacularly and constitutes many families‘ largest asset. 
Id. (citations omitted).  
 174. See WIESE, supra note 168, at 129. 
 175. I will point out that white homeowners are most likely to be able to absorb such a loss in net 
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though I am not suggesting the repeal of the current deductions for 
existing homes, these homes would no longer be as attractive to new 
purchasers since new purchasers could not receive tax benefits unless they 
moved into ―racially diverse‖ communities. The price—which previously 
included the tax deduction—would at least fall by that amount, because 
the house was no longer eligible for the tax deductions. 
That would mean middle- and upper-income white homes would 
decrease in value—along with the homes of any blacks or Latinos who 
lived in those neighborhoods, e.g., Chris Rock. Yet the value decline 
would not have to be permanent. Homogeneous neighborhoods could 
become ―racially diverse‖ neighborhoods if they managed to attract 
prospective black homeowners to their neighborhoods. Low-income, 
overwhelmingly white neighborhoods might have a more arduous task 
than that faced by higher-income, homogeneous white neighborhoods 
because of the differences in neighborhood amenities.  
Perhaps one alternative scenario is that whites decide to forego their 
tax benefits as the price they pay to live in homogeneous communities. I 
am reminded of Derrick Bell‘s fictional Racial Preference Licensing Act, 
which would permit whites to discriminate, but they would have to pay ―a 
tax‖ for the ability to do so.176 Whites would make the conscious choice to 
purchase homes in overwhelmingly white neighborhoods—which would 
now be less valuable because they no longer include the benefit of the tax 
deduction. If that were the outcome, then we certainly would not be any 
worse off than we are under current circumstances; however, the majority 
of black homeowners would be better off. 
4. Solutions Rejected 
If I were writing on a clean slate, my preference might be to repeal the 
deductions and exclusions for housing. My hesitation is due to the race 
and class impact that repeal may have on the net worth of existing low-
income and black and Latino homeowners.  
 
 
wealth because they are most likely to have net worth from a variety of different sources. See 
KOCHHAR, supra note 69, at 19 (showing that while 61% of mean net worth is found in Latinos‘ 
homes and 63% is found in black homes, only 38.5% is found in white homes with 21.9% of white 
mean net worth coming from stock ownership.). 
 176. Cf. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 47–
64 (1992). 
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CHART 5.1 MEAN NET WORTH BY SELECTED ASSET TYPE
177
 
Chart 5.1 tells us that 61% of the value of mean net worth is found in 
Latinos‘ homes, while 63% is found in black homes, but only 38.5% is 
found in white homes. The total mean net worth for whites is $221,871, 
followed by $65,371 for Latinos, and $45,711 for blacks.
178
 So, even 
though the greatest percentage of homeownership net worth is found in the 
black community, blacks have the lowest mean housing net worth.  
Chart 5.1 also shows that a significantly larger percentage of white 
mean net worth is found in their ownership of stocks (and mutual funds) 
than that found in black and Latino households. Whites have 21.9% of 
their mean net worth coming from stock ownership, whereas Latinos have 
7.2% of their mean net worth and blacks have 5.6% of their mean net 
worth coming from stock ownership. Finally, chart 5.1 shows us that 
blacks have 11.5% of their mean net worth coming from 401(k) accounts, 
followed by whites with 7.4%, and Latinos with 7.3%. The data on 401(k) 
accounts should not be confused with employer-provided pension plans, 
which are not covered in this chart. As I have written previously, blacks, 
Latinos, and Asians are less likely to participate in employer-provided 
pension plans
179—and if they do participate, more likely to have lower 
balances at retirement.
180
 
 
 
 177. KOCHHAR, supra note 69, at 2 (―The percentage of White households who owned homes in 
2002 was 74.3 percent. The homeownership rates for Hispanic and Black households were 47.3 
percent and 47.7 percent respectively.‖). 
 178. Id. at 19. 
 179. Brown, Pensions, supra note 48; Brown, Risk Aversion, supra note 48. 
 180. Brown, Pensions, supra note 48; Brown, Risk Aversion, supra note 48. 
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The stock market is considered, over the long term, to be the 
investment with the greatest returns.
181
 While this may seem largely 
academic in the current market, the point is not to be missed. Over the 
long term, returns on investing in the stock market have proven to be 
greater than all other alternative investments. 
To the extent that blacks and Latinos invest less in the stock market 
than whites do, their wealth will differ significantly—regardless of income 
level.
182 
Black investors think that real estate is a better place to invest 
their money than either stocks or bonds.
183
 Blacks also think insurance 
policies are good investment vehicles.
184
  
One study shows that, for the lowest-income homeowners, home equity 
accounted for 80% of their net worth, compared to 48% for middle-income 
homeowners and 26% of high-income homeowners.
185
 Chart 5.2 shows the 
class dimension to this dilemma. Low-income homeowners have a higher 
percentage of their net worth tied up in housing than high-income 
homeowners.  
 
 
 181. Brown, Pensions, supra note 48, at 1536 (citing Martha N. Ozawa & Yat-Sang Lum, Taking 
Risks in Investing in the Equity Market: Racial and Ethnic Differences, 12 J. AGING & SOC. POL‘Y 1, 3 
(2001); James M. Poterba et al., 401(k) Plans and Future Patterns of Retirement Saving, 88 AM. 
ECON. REV. 179, 181 (1998)). 
 182. Cf. Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on 
Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 MO. L. REV. 341, 366 (2000). 
 183. Brown, Risk Aversion, supra note 48, at 399 (citing Luisa Beltran, Many Black Investors 
Back in Market, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 28, 2004, at 21 (―[T]he study found that 61 percent of 
blacks and 51 percent of whites believe that real estate is the best investment overall.‖); Sandra Block, 
African-American Investors Catching Up, USA TODAY, June 24, 2004, at 2B (―[M]ost black investors 
believe real estate is the best overall investment . . . .‖); Francine Knowles, African Americans Exit 
Stocks, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 25, 2003, at 65 (―Fifty percent of blacks viewed real estate as the best 
investment . . . .‖); Tristan Mabry, Black Investors Shy Away from Stocks: Women in Particular are 
Afraid to Trust Brokerage Firms, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1999, at A2 (―Blacks . . . tend to favor much 
more conservative investment vehicles, including real estate and insurance.‖); Sheila Muto, The 
Property Report: Plots & Ploys, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2004, at B6 (―Black investors continue to think 
real estate is a better place to invest their money than stocks, bonds or mutual funds, according to a 
survey of black and white households earning more than $50,000 a year.‖)). 
 184. See Mabry, supra note 183, at A2. 
 185. See Stegman et al., supra note 45, at 4. 
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CHART 5.2 PERCENTAGE NET WEALTH IN HOME EQUITY BY CLASS 
If repeal of the mortgage interest deduction reduces the value of 
housing as many suggest, it would disproportionately decrease the net 
worth of low-income, black and Latino homeowners—the very groups this 
author is trying to assist. For example, all homeowners have 
approximately 40% of their net worth tied up in their homes while high-
income homeowners have slightly more than 25%. Low-income 
homeowners have close to 80% of their net worth tied up in their homes. 
Any repeal of the mortgage interest deduction would reduce the price of 
housing. Although experts do not agree on how much the reduction would 
be, or even whether it would last long-term, most agree that initially the 
price of housing would fall. High-income homeowners with the lowest 
amount of net worth in their homes would be best able to weather that 
event, and low-income homeowners would be least able. Charts 5.1 and 
5.2 show that repeal of the mortgage interest deduction is likely to 
negatively impact low-income, black and Latino homeowners. As a result, 
without further research, I hesitate to make such a radical proposal.  
Another alternative that I have considered and rejected is to allow a 
deduction for rent. One reservation is that landlords would generally use 
the deduction to increase rental prices, which would not support the goal 
of affordable housing. This is a different problem from the mortgage 
interest deduction increasing the price of housing. In that instance, it is the 
homeowner who has the potential to receive that benefit—here it is not the 
renter, but the landlord. In order to address the class problems as well, 
such a deduction, if enacted, would have to be in the form of a refundable 
credit for all the reasons previously discussed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Wealth building for communities of color is an important issue for the 
twenty-first century.
186
 Federal tax policies that ―support homeownership‖ 
should be examined from a race and class perspective in order to 
understand which demographic groups such policies are actually helping. 
This Article has shown that those policies disadvantage low-income 
homeowners regardless of race because they are often unable to benefit 
from existing tax law.  
This Article has also shown that federal tax provisions supporting 
homeownership disadvantage middle- and upper-income blacks because 
the majority are renters and not homeowners. Middle- and upper-income 
black homeowners, however, are disadvantaged when compared with their 
white counterparts because of the quality of the housing they live in and 
because of a race-based penalty in the housing market, which limits their 
ability to receive significant appreciation upon sale—as their white 
counterparts do. Current federal housing tax policies (which disadvantage 
taxpayers on the basis of race and class) must be eliminated and, in their 
place, rules should be enacted that seek to afford all an equal opportunity 
to benefit from the American Dream of homeownership.  
 
 
 186. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 65 (―This is not simply a story about counting money; families think 
about using wealth first as a private safety net, and second as a vehicle to launch mobility into middle-
class status, homeownership, business development, or a more secure retirement.‖) (citation omitted). 
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